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ABSTRACT
Denial: A Sociological Theory
by
Christina Nadler
Advisor: Lynn Chancer
This dissertation develops a theory of sociological denial through an investigation of contested
social problems. I begin by reviewing the literature on denial, both sociological and
psychological, in order to situate the project and exemplify the relevance and need for a
sociological theory of denial. Then, through examining three scales of the social, I account for
multiple layers of the social structure and denial’s place in each. These scales are the sites at
which denial happens: geographic, cognitive, and unconscious. I explore five contested social
problems through varied paradigms that allow me to analyze each scale of the structural. I thus
look at settler colonialism, Israeli apartheid, mass incarceration, industrialized animal slaughter,
and environmental destruction, each through a sociospatial, sociomental, and psychosocial
paradigm. I then turn to five organizations that seek to address these contested social problems. I
explore their mission statements and campaigns to analyze how they are already engaging with
sociological denial and how they could do more. The conclusion offers suggestions for how
structural denial can be confronted, emphasizing the need for sociologists and social movement
actors to give more weight to the psychosocial, alongside the already prevalent sociospatial and
sociomental perspectives.
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Chapter One
Introduction
In February 2014, the Barnard Center for Research on Women began a dialogue series
called “No One is Disposable.”1 In a conversation between activist Reina Gossett and legal
scholar Dean Spade, Spade argues that when it comes to crime, poverty, and mental illness, the
dominant approach in the United States is to attempt to hide the problems away in order to try to
“live in a world where [we] don’t have to see that kind of thing.”2 Spade and Gossett connect this
directly to prison, which they then connect to the larger societal structure and its problems.
Prisons come to stand for what we, as a society, do not want to deal with, paradoxically masked
as a solution to the problem. Many social problems, though, are masked by myths of social
progress. Supreme Court decisions on gay marriage distract from police brutality and the
persistent murder of trans people, particularly trans people of color. Inequality has not gone
away. Consider, for example, how slavery shifted into Jim Crow, and with a black president in
office there were comparable rates of police shootings of black people as there were lynchings
during the Jim Crow era.3
The conversation between Spade and Gossett sparked in me a realization that so much of
what we deal with as sociologists is related to denial, though it is not often addressed as such.
Denial becomes more than a social problem itself; as denial is implemented, ironically, to “deal”
with other social problems, it becomes ingrained into the fiber of society as a structural
arrangement. In this dissertation, I take up how sociologists might examine denial in far greater
social and philosophical detail by highlighting how it appears in many sociological literatures,
specifically literature that addresses space, classification, and the unconscious. Using cognitive
sociology as a model—a theoretical orientation that as Zerubavel details in “Generally
-1-

Speaking,” encourages tapping disparate examples to investigate patterns4—I look for patterns of
denial in seemingly disparate settings, including industrialized slaughter, settler colonialism in
the United States, Israeli apartheid as it relates to the United States, mass incarceration, and
environmental destruction. I also focus on social disagreements over these examples, which
creates contention over who and what is being denied. Yet, as I argue overall denial is itself
structured into society at all levels, from its physical geography to its cognitive classification
systems to the collective unconscious.
METHODOLOGY
In this theoretical dissertation, I draw on a pair of methodological frameworks: feminist
methodology, in which the position of the observer in relation to the observed is emphasized, and
social pattern analysis. Both methodologies influenced how I approached the subject of
sociological denial as well as my selection of the cases I explored. As a feminist sociologist, I
place myself in my work and use sociological tools to organize my own experiences and
“situated” knowledge as an activist working on issues brought up in this dissertation. Again, and
in addition, social pattern analysis as detailed in Zerubavel’s significant “methodological” essay
“Generally Speaking”5 provides the second framework around which I have organized the
ensuing sociological, philosophical, and theoretical investigation. I discuss both methodologies
in greater depth below.
First, I used feminist methodology to identify cases insofar as—drawing on the work of
Reinharz, Haraway, Hill Collins and Harding, among others—I begin with where I am “situated”
in the world.6 According to Reinharz, for example, a relationship constantly pervades how
observers/researchers view that which is observed/researched and needs to be spelled out.
Feminists like Reinharz explain that because no work can be value free, our methodologies must
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acknowledge this fact and work from this position. Thus, I take it as an advantage rather than a
disadvantage that I am familiar as an activist with five cases: mass incarceration, industrialized
animal slaughter, environmental destruction, settler colonialism in the United States (the process
where colonizers came to a land and remained on the land), and Israeli apartheid.
Second, though, with respect to social pattern analysis, I have selected these cases
precisely because they are at once similar and different. Similarly, I contend that each involves
denial but that they do so in quite varying ways: questioning climate change and forgetting
animal slaughter (when eating meat) are extremely divergent examples, even as I argue that
common aspects of sociological denial are involved across these instances. This is where social
pattern analysis is relevant as a method that values the use of disparate examples in cases, like
denial, where recurrent themes would otherwise be hard or impossible to discern from only one
case or from more obviously equitable instances.
This brings me to what is also, and relatedly, a central reason for selecting the major
examples on which this dissertation focuses. The five topics to be discussed share three selection
criteria. First, in each of these cases, there has been contention within and without the social
problem; at least two sides of debate emerged. Second, a given problem may be a very old one
(such as colonialism), but contemporary instantiations recur as with the settler colonialism and
Israeli-Palestinian examples. Third and finally, each of my examples has spawned contemporary
social movements precisely because of debates about whether and in what way social denial has
occurred. Below I take up each of these three points in turn. Though countless other examples
could have been discussed, especially with the results of the 2016 election making past social
denial more obvious, the differences in these cases have allowed for the similarities to become
more analytically meaningful.
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Contention
Contention emerges when defining a social problem. What is a problem? When
discussing denial, this question becomes quite complicated. Indeed, the contention I have used as
a criterion is about this very question: Is there even a problem? Is, for example, mass
incarceration a problem? Because this is a sociological project, this is a conceptual—not moral—
problematic. And the argument must follow regardless of whether one morally agrees. Therefore,
I do not proceed with this work making an argument that, say, incarceration or eating meat is
wrong. Rather, I identify a series of consistent principles related to violation, which I explain
below, that are articulated from the social movement side of the contention. These violations are
at times themselves denied—claimed not to be violations. And at other times it is denied the
violation is unjust. The latter denial becomes more complicated to confront sociologically than
morally. For the purposes of this dissertation, I return to the criteria indicated above: again, one
important reason for selecting the cases is contention exists on whether it is in fact an “issue.”
To elucidate this problem, let me turn to industrialized animal slaughter. Of the five
issues I take up in this dissertation, one might say that this is the most contentious in the sense
that many do not recognize a problem with the situation of industrialized animal slaughter. If the
reader does not see the relevance of an analysis of the production of meat, it is this very opinion
that makes it relevant—because other people feel the relevance to social conditions very
strongly. The same might be said for a reader who thinks prisons are necessary to lock away bad
people; prison abolitionists feel the opposite very strongly. Like the paradox of denial—knowing
and not knowing—the examples I take up in this dissertation are all problems for some and not
problems for others. In this work I focus not on whether or not the social movements or
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mainstream society are morally justified in their claims but rather how and why the claims are
made.
The central condition of this first criterion, contention, is that certain claims about
violations are being made. Generally speaking, claims made by social movements are claims of
violation of rights to spatial and bodily autonomy. These are moral and not legal rights, for in all
of these cases the violations are legally permissible. This condition accentuates the contention
because society itself has deemed these actions acceptable, yet not everyone agrees. A cow does
not have the legal right to her life or her bodily or spatial freedom. But social movements would
claim that she has a moral right. Those convicted of a crime lose legal rights over their own
bodies and freedom of movement. Social movements claim this violates a moral right.
Palestinians in Gaza do not have permission to move freely, to either leave or stay on their land.
With international laws possibly exempted, Israel has the legal right to produce these conditions
of limited bodily and spatial autonomy, but social movements claim they do not have the moral
right to do this. Though the Dakota Access Pipeline may move forward with legal authority,
native tribes, veterans, and many other social movement actors have claimed an injustice, a
moral wrong. And most destruction of the environment is perfectly legal, though social
movements would claim that it is nonetheless wrong, or morally unjust, and ultimately violates
the autonomy of the earth itself and the bodily and spatial freedom of those inhabiting this earth
(which is everyone) when humans continue to suffer the effects of climate change.
Of course, many other social movements exist that I do not discuss, and as much as they
may articulate the movement as a struggle over a social problem, the contention does not exist in
the same way. Seeking to end rape and rape culture is also very important to me as a feminist
scholar-activist, but I do not discuss it in this dissertation because unlike the other cases, rape is
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illegal. This, however, points to an important consideration—producing change in the laws
alone, or even what people are “allowed” to say in mainstream discourse, will not be enough to
end the conditions. Though rape is “on-the-books” illegal, the culture at large still seems
uncertain about whether or not rape is morally wrong. There is contention, but it is not the same
contention; though rape persists, the discourse is not a question of whether it should persist as a
social necessity.
Contemporary Instantiations
The second criterion for the examples discussed in this dissertation is that, even though
many of the issues date back for centuries, these are contemporary instantiations. For example,
the colonization of North America by settlers dates back to 1492 but the struggle is not over, and
there are still contestations over the rights of indigenous people, for example in the case of the
Dakota Access Pipeline and the rights over the Standing Rock territory. The struggle between
Israel and Palestine dates back thousands of years depending on the perspective one takes,
though the more contemporary issues began at the end of World War II and continue today
through the expansion of Israeli settlements. The destruction of the earth has been in the works
for hundreds of years, though the severity and rapidity of climate change brings the issue to
intense relevance at present. Though the eating of meat is not new, the industrialized factory
setting of meat production and animal slaughter is recent and has been fine-tuned through
technological advancement. Under the Obama administration, prison reform entered the
mainstream discourse after decades of prison expansion that created mass incarceration, as
opposed to incarceration, which is a new phenomenon, with a new struggle, and that brings me
to the third criterion.
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Social Movements
A related social movement is a necessary condition of the examples because contention
necessitates (at least) one side fighting the dominant narrative, led by social movements. In the
penultimate chapter of this dissertation, I explicitly take up this criterion and how social
movements have come up against and struggled with social denial in these issues. Social
movements are tasked with creating change, and they must do so in the face of denial. To
investigate how social movements try to create change despite the social fact of collective denial,
I explore the documents and campaigns of five organizations, each taking up one of the five
issues discussed in the previous three chapters. I look at textual documents to find common
arguments and critiques. Specifically, I explore the work of People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals (PETA), Greenpeace, the Vera Institute for Justice, Stand with Standing Rock, and the
United States Coalition for Palestinian Rights. There are many other organizations and
collectives addressing these issues, but my reasons to choose these large ones for the purposes of
this study are as follows. All of these organizations are national or international, are recognized
as key players in the social movements for their respective issues. Though environmental
concerns and indigenous rights overlap, particularly with the pipeline threatening the
environment and indigenous sovereignty, I have primarily tried to select organizations that are
not intersectional, in the sense of taking up more than one cause at a time.
Social Pattern Analysis
With its origins in classical sociology (particularly Simmel, continuing through Goffman
and many other sociologists) social pattern analysis,7 a term coined by Eviatar Zerubavel,
explores general forms and patterns of varied cultural and historical situations. Though not
oblivious to individual and situational differences, social pattern analysts are more centrally
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concerned with articulating generalities and near universals. Using this as a mode of inquiry, one
decontextualizes findings from specific contexts. What is unique about social pattern analysis is
that it allows a researcher to engage deeply with specific contexts and still speak generally about
social patterns. Within this theoretical project, I use this method to articulate how denial operates
on many different levels of social interaction. I can thereby traverse varied examples, moving
through how denial manifests itself in myriad ways. As with patterns in the real world, there are
slippages and leaks between them, but the typologies developed through social pattern analysis
serve as a helpful hermeneutic for examining the complexity and depth of denial in Western
society. Consequently, I use this method to theoretically investigate denial.
Because this methodology requires the identification of patterns, which become identified
through the process of theorization, at the start of the investigation it may not be clear exactly
how the pattern will unfold. Indeed, the theory of denial I articulate in this work was not known
until after the process had begun. In developing theory, the sociologist may see a pattern—
perhaps even just unconsciously—only to identify it explicitly in the end. Social pattern analysis
allowed me to see patterns that allowed me to identify denial’s function at three levels—
geography, classification system, and unconscious aggression.
CONTEXTUALIZING DENIAL AS SOCIOLOGICAL
Two books to date have been written on denial as an explicitly sociological phenomenon.
These theorize denial as their central focus rather than a special type of denial like climate
change. Here I focus on these two works but expand my analysis on the general literature on
denial in the literature review that follows. Stanley Cohen’s States of Denial8 and Eviatar
Zerubavel’s The Elephant in the Room9 lay the groundwork for taking up denial as a social
pattern. Zerubavel focuses on conspiracies of silence, and Cohen is most concerned with
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bystanders to atrocities and genocides. Though both provide a small but substantive literature
with which to converse, my approach differs in significant ways. For the kinds of denial I will
take up in this dissertation, the concept of the bystander alone will not be as useful as it was for
Cohen. For instance, one does not typically speak of bystanders to climate change. Though
atrocious, climate change is not an atrocitiy in the general sense of the word. The examples I will
take up in this dissertation are more complicated—a cheeseburger, for one, cannot be talked
about as an atrocity, but it still arguably involves sociological denial.
In this dissertation I also shift the chronology of denial farther back than Cohen and
Zerubavel; both are focused on the things people “know” are wrong and why they do not act. I
want to know why society creates these environments so that one does not have to act. I am
much less concerned here with the aberrant than I am with the ordinary. While Cohen and
Zerubavel focus is on the exceptional, I focus on the mundane. Consequently, rather than
viewing only specific problems of denial, I see denial itself as a key aspect of the structuring of
society. Through examining patterns of denial, I was able to identify three mechanisms of
sociological denial—comprising my theoretical approach to denial—and to which one chapter is
devoted. These mechanisms—physical distancing, cognitive classification, and unconscious
aggression—all have related methods of analysis that I call, respectively, sociospatial,
sociomental, and psychosocial.
I thus also look more to the workings of the unconscious as an explanation than do Cohen
and Zerubavel. Neither takes the unconscious as a significant sociological problem that must be
thought of in sociological terms, referring to primarily the cognitive aspects of denial in culture.
In addition to expanding the discussion of sociological denial to the unconscious, I also explore
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how denial is manifested materially, in space. This analysis facilitates engaging the question of
the creation of physical and psychic environments that allow for denial.
MECHANISMS OF DENIAL
In this dissertation I focus on three key mechanisms I have identified through social
pattern analysis and through which social denial is produced and maintained: physical
distancing, cognitive classification, and unconscious aggression. None of these is complete on its
own; denial is always partial, as it can never be complete or it would cease to be paradoxical. In
other words, one must always have a balance of partial awareness and partial ignorance, which
are produced through the three mechanisms. Physical distancing requires spatial separation: the
built environment is constructed to make it so that members of a community, culture, or society
do not have to see certain things; in fact, space is often arranged so that it is impossible to see
things simply at will. However, not everything is separated physically, and things are not always
hidden, so there must be other ways to account for denial. Cognitive classification produces
denial in another way. Even when a given society can see what they have geographically been
cut off from, they can and do use categories to divide the world into “us and them” categories.
The cultural and cognitive production of the “other” does much work as a mechanism of denial
to separate those one cares for from those one does not. However, though categories may be
necessary to human sociality, oppression based on categories need not be. So how can the
production of not just any “other” but the hated “other” be accounted for? This is where the
unconscious mechanisms of denial come into play. This mechanism of denial helps to illuminate
what might be left out of the categories, i.e., why we might collectively and unconsciously want
others to suffer. This mechanism can be so ephemeral that the structural issues may not be fully
visible, which points back to the first mechanism—the actual structure of society. These three

-10-

mechanisms then work in tandem, cyclically, to produce and maintain denial at the structural
level.
PARADIGMS FOR ANALYSIS OF DENIAL
To address the three mechanisms of denial identified, I employ three paradigms of
analysis that target each mechanism at the relevant scale of society: the sociospatial, the
sociomental, and the psychosocial. Each paradigm has strengths and limitations. The sociospatial
paradigm helps demonstrate that the social structure is constructed to produce certain conditions,
but it does not account for the ideological. For example, it does not explain why the structure is
produced this way; it focuses on the fact that social structure is produced this way. The system
becomes a Durkheimian social fact, without awareness of the ideological justifications that
create the system. For such further insight, I turn to the next paradigm, the sociomental. This
paradigm helps to understand the division of the world into categories: even when one can
physically see things, one’s cultural categories of cognition sometimes prevents “seeing” them—
they are placed out of a cognitive framing of the world, or hidden in plain sight, as Eviatar
Zerubavel might say.10 What the sociomental does not explain is change—it can be a static
paradigm in some of the same ways the sociospatial paradigm can be, focusing on that things are
a certain way instead of why. The final paradigm, the psychosocial, complements the first two
with an analysis that goes deeper into the why. Denial is a paradox of knowing and not knowing,
and thus this complexity must be accounted for with some kind of understanding of the
unconscious to piece together the possibility of both knowing and not knowing. Yet this
psychosocial paradigm does not provide the same possibility for empirical evidence that a
sociospatial or sociomental framework would; I thus use all three in this dissertation.

-11-

I have selected these three paradigms not just for their contribution to the study of denial
but because together they offer a comprehensive view of the social world. Each paradigm is
grounded in the perspective of a particular classical theorist, namely, Marx, Durkheim, and
Freud. Together they illuminate denial in different but overlapping ways. My aim is to work
through the advantages and disadvantages of each, focusing here, in the introduction, on the
larger approach to studying that particular scale of sociality and, in the later chapters,
exemplifying the strengths of the paradigms by using them to analyze a mechanism of denial.
Sociospatial
A materialist analysis drawing from Marx requires any examination of social processes to
start with the material world—to look at material conditions and understand the reciprocal
experience of how humans shape the world and how they are shaped by the world. Marx, as a
historical materialist, starts with the material to keep his theory grounded in actual conditions. In
Capital Volume 1 Marx begins his analysis with the commodity; this is because commodities can
be touched, felt, and seen, in contrast to something like money, which is a representation.11
Ultimately, Marx follows the materiality of the commodity to make the argument for class
struggle. In this way, he begins with an incontestable fact—the materiality of the object—on
which he grounds the whole of his argument. Using a materialist theory can help to illuminate
social problems by grounding the argument in the materiality of the cases that concern the
present study. People are incarcerated, locked in cages. Animals are slaughtered en masse on
brutal factory farms. Black people are gunned down and murdered by the police. The climate is
rapidly changing. Israel continues to develop settlements on Palestinian land. Mass social action
needed to be taken to halt the Dakota Access Pipeline from being built through sacred Native
American land.
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I also start with Marx because he reminds his readers to begin with what they can
experience through their senses, what they see or touch, and, in relation to denial, what they do
not have to see or experience. This is what leads me to consider geographic and spatial relations.
Thinking of materiality as being inextricably linked to the social world prompts scrutiny of how
the world is divided—the material actualities of social divisions. Whereas for Weber, class might
be more connected to cognitive understandings of status, for Marx, class boundaries are a
material distinction and labor a material practice. Marx states that,
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man,
through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between
himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in
motion the natural forces which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands,
in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs.
Through this movement he acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he
simultaneously changes his own nature.12
Our labor is not just a manipulation of the built environment but a true engagement where the
relationship is reciprocal. Humanity is not apart from nature; humans’ truest calling is to allow
nature to shape humanity. Labor creates people as much as people create things out of their
resources.
Labor, for Marx, is species being, people’s calling to engage as humans in the world; it is
the perversion of labor under capitalism that makes capitalism so monstrous. Labor is the purest
form of engagement with the world, and capitalism changes those terms, denying what kind of
lives individuals should and could be living. As Marx observed, “At the end of every labour
process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning,
hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of form in the materials of nature;
he also realizes his own purpose in those materials.”13 Under capitalism, this is constrained—
workers are alienated from their species being, and we find no purpose in their labor. In turning
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species being into wage labor under capital, capitalism makes a move to deny that people have
this call to labor and engagement outside of the constraints of capitalism. Capitalism is premised
on the denial of species being.
In “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,” Marx makes clear how much loss there is
under capitalism:
So much does labour’s realization appear as a loss of reality that the worker loses reality
to the point of starving to death. So much does objectification appear as a loss of the
object that the worker is robbed of the objects most necessary not only for his life but for
his work. Indeed, labour itself becomes an object which he can get hold of only with the
greatest effort and with the most irregular interruptions. So much does the appropriation
of the object appear as estrangement that the more objects the worker produces the fewer
he can possess and the more he falls under the dominion of his product, capital.14
Social actors become estranged from themselves in capitalism, but capitalism, along with what
Marx calls political economy, “conceals the estrangement.”15 In not recognizing what a society
loses in capitalism, social subjects deny the loss exists, cannot grieve it, and build denial into the
structure of the society. I call this paradigm and method of analysis, informed by Marxism, the
sociospatial paradigm because I focus on space as the specific instantiation of materiality.
Sociomental
Althusser picks up where Marx leaves off, providing a groundwork for thinking through
the superstructure, whereas Marx was focused more on the base. Althusser bridges this transition
from sociospatial analysis to the sociomental paradigm. Though Althusser is a Marxist, his
expansion of the confines of materiality of traditional Marxism to include ideology is helpful
here for seeing the dialectical relationship between the sociospatial and the sociomental.
Whereas Marx focused on the conditions of production, Althusser uses ideology to understand
the reproduction of society. To understand denial, it is necessary as well to understand how to
reproduce a society that is based on denial. Here the paradox of denial begins to be visible—the
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society reproduces conditions that its members both know and do not know they are reproducing.
As Althusser paraphrases Marx, “Every child knows that a social formation which did not
reproduce the conditions of production at the same time as it produced would not last a year. The
ultimate condition of production is therefore the reproduction of the conditions of production.”16
By the reproduction of society, I mean here the reproduction of a system built on putting things
out of sight—what the sociospatial analysis accounts for—but that system must be reproduced
over and over again, with some conscious intention. So the question of this next scale of analysis
is, how is it possible to see things and still keep them out of mind? To whom, to what, where,
and when do individuals pay attention and when are they able to turn that attention off?
In the Marxist language of Althusser, a move from sociospatial analysis to sociomental is
a move from the base to the superstructure:
We can therefore say that the great theoretical advantage of the Marxist topography, i.e.
of the spatial metaphor of the edifice (base and superstructure) is simultaneously that it
reveals that questions of determination (or of index of effectivity) are crucial; that it
reveals that it is the base which in the last instance determines the whole edifice; and that,
as a consequence, it obliges us to pose the theoretical problem of the types of
“derivatory” effectivity peculiar to the superstructure, i.e. it obliges us to think what the
Marxist tradition calls conjointly the relative autonomy of the superstructure and the
reciprocal action of the superstructure on the base.17
In this approach to understanding society, Althusser leads into a different sociological tradition,
Durkheimian analysis. Although Durkheim and Althusser have different conceptions of society,
their views are similar in terms of the production of the individual. Althusser states that
“throughout this schema we observe that the ideological representation of ideology is itself
forced to recognize that every ‘subject’ endowed with a ‘consciousness’ and believing in the
‘ideas’ that his ‘consciousness’ inspires in him and freely accepts, must act according to his
ideas’, must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material
practice.”18
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Like Althusser, Durkheim intricately connects society with individual consciousness to
produce an understanding of how consciousness is shaped by the social world: “The
consciousness of society, moreover, is not of a different nature from that of the individual. The
latter is also produced by a coalescence of elementary consciousnesses (consciences), of
representations or impressions which are concentrated in a more or less definite self (moi); it is a
‘coalesced whole’ like the social consciousness.”19 As if Durkheim were finishing Althusser’s
argument, presented earlier, on the reproduction of the means of production, he says that “society
can exist only if it penetrates the consciousness of individuals and fashions it in ‘its image and
resemblance.’”21 The shift in focus is from material and geographic divisions to how these
divisions manifest cognitively, for material divisions are often porous; there is always a cognitive
trace that cannot be hidden completely. Durkheim provides the tools for grounding this cognitive
understanding of denial in his initial articulation of the sociological production of the self. For
Durkheim, the social world produces members of a society as individuals and shapes their
mental lives.22 The social realm, and more specifically the collective, come to shape what is
normal in the production of the social world. Durkheim argues that even spatial and temporal
divisions are of social origin: “To dispose things spatially there must be a possibility of placing
them differently, of putting some at the right, others at the left, these above, those below, at the
north of or at the south of, east or west of, etc., etc., just as to dispose states of consciousness
temporally there must be a possibility of localizing them at determined dates.”23 A Durkheimian
perspective then provides a richer analysis of the social world, and of denial specifically, by
balancing the spatial analysis with that of cognition. Cognitive sociology, via a sociomental
analysis, helps demonstrate how these material divisions reflect in social consciousness—from
these material divisions comes an even more solid cognitive division into “us” and “them.”
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Psychosocial
Durkheim’s position that mental life is produced through society recommends a look, as
well, at how to account for the social production of the unconscious. I now move dialectically
beyond the conscious to consider how the unconscious is also socially structured. All of Freudian
theory relies on the idea that the unconscious is structured through social interactions, be they as
macro as civilization or as micro as an infant being fed. The self, including the unconscious, is a
social production.
We see evidence of the social development of the self, not only in Durkheim but in Freud
as well, particularly in his Three Essays. From the earliest stages of development, all aspects of
the psyche are constructed in relation to the social environment. This is a unique feature of the
human species—other mammals are born less premature than humans and thus do not have the
same opportunity for social development. The premature birth of humans, after only three and
not four “trimesters,” is foundational to understanding how members of the species are produced
as highly social beings. Unlike a calf, for example, who can be somewhat self-sufficient after
birth, walking minutes after being born, human infants are completely dependent on the social
environment they are born into—as Freud recognized.24
The first seeds of sexuality, as the foundation of the individual psyche, can be seen in
infancy. One example is the autoerotic act of thumbsucking: Although autoerotic, it is a socially
produced act. This behavior “is determined by a search for some pleasure which has already been
experienced and is now remembered.” This memory is of the “most vital activity” of being fed.
The development of the infant is necessarily social; they must be cared for to survive. Sexuality,
and thus the self, emerges from a social interaction with a caregiver, the biological drive to be
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fed, the pleasure of the erotogenic zones of the lips, and the memory of the pleasure of this
interaction.25
The unconscious development of individuality and agency is again produced through
biosocial and psychosocial processes. Once the infant progresses out of the first stage of
autoerotic sexuality, the next stage is also equally a balance between the biological and social,
further demonstrating that they cannot be thought of separately. “Like the labial zone, the anal
zone is well suited by its position to act as a medium through which sexuality may attach itself to
other somatic functions.”26 This well-suited medium for sexuality functions such that an
individual child may express control over their body by defecating on their own terms. This
expresses the child’s willful compliance or disobedience to social order, but of course these are
not consciously formed thoughts in young children; this happens unconsciously.
For Freud, the biology of the body and the materiality of the environment are inseparable
from the social world and the psyche. He offers to sociology an analysis of the individual that is
grounded not only in the social environment but also in the materiality of the body. This
illustrates the thread between the three scales of society—the sociospatial, the sociomental, and
this psychosocial level of the unconscious. Psychosocial frameworks can shed light on denial in
different ways. Though most psychoanalysis is still targeted toward individual psyches, I
maintain that psychoanalysis is always inherently a sociological project because the unconscious
exceeds the individual subject and is produced by, and inextricable from, its social conditions.
Thus even as I turn to psychoanalysis in the final paradigm, my argument remains structural and
macro.
These three paradigms help to construct a more complete picture of denial than in the
previous sociological literature on the subject; the spatial, cognitive, and unconscious ways in
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which people make classifications and push things out of mind and physically away must be
understood. The chapters of this dissertation will include an integration of cases and theory
within three mechanisms of denial that all work in tandem.
DISSERTATION STRUCTURE
The ensuing Chapter 2 offers a literature review on the topic of denial. Because exploring
denial as an explicitly sociological phenomenon is still a relatively new undertaking, I explore
denial as it has been written about in varied different contexts. In doing so, I underscore the
importance of this unique articulation of sociological denial, and I situate the dissertation in
relation to a larger literature.
In Chapter 3, I take up denial as it is manifested through physical distancing whereby
problems are hidden away. This kind of denial is often presented as a way of dealing with the
problem but is in fact a mode of avoidance. I use literature on space and geography to develop a
Marxist sociospatial paradigm to analyze physical distancing. Through exploration of the five
contested social problems, I identity patterns of distancing through containment, exclusion, and
elimination. One example of distancing, which I discuss in depth in Chapter 3, is use of mass
incarceration in the United States. Rather than confront the social conditions that lead to racism,
poverty, and addiction, society criminalizes entire populations of people and locks them away in
cage-like structures, i.e., prison cells. Prisons are often physically removed from populated areas
in rural areas with small-town populations. Jails are often not in communities either. Presenting a
notorious example, New York City’s Rikers Island. Here, jailed members of society are
physically moved to an island that exists only as a jail. There are exceptions to this “out of sight,
out of mind” mentality, though, and the rest of Chapter 3 explores the limits of spatial analysis.
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In Chapter 4, I turn to mechanisms that allow people to continue to keep distancing
themselves from injustice even once it is in their minds. It explores denial through cognitive
classifications of the way the “other” is produced and divided among categories. This includes
and yet goes deeper than geographic divisions. In the social production of “us” and “them,” we
(“us”) are able to distance ourselves from the “other”; such distancing is often used in order to
deny their oppression. I trace patterns of othering through ideas of dominion, cultural identity,
and dehumanization. A historical example is the production of a racialized other to justify
genocide of Native Americans and slavery; such denial facilitated the colonization of the
Americas and the labor to develop the American economy. In a more contemporary example, the
production of the “criminal other” justifies incarcerating huge percentages of black and brown
people. Having now talked about the geographic and material structures as well as the
phenomenological structures of consciousness, I next consider more deeply the unconscious
structures.
The third mechanism of denial is examined in Chapter 5. Here I examine why it is
unfortunately not sufficient just to bring awareness to problems—because it is possible to both
know and not know at the same time. Awareness and ignorance are paradoxically compatible
systems of thought. To explain this paradox, I draw in this chapter from psychoanalytic literature
to examine unconscious aggression, which I argue is central to denial—in contrast to other
theories that would maintain denial is about avoiding displeasure. I look at examples of cruelty in
society, from the torture of solitary confinement to genocide. Particularly, I focus on the
construction of the self and the state, good/bad binaries, and disavowal. By doing so I make the
argument that part of the split that happens in denial is that people are ambivalent, culturally,
about the suffering of others because they have unacknowledged aggression.
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In the Chapter 6, I then turn to five organizations to explore claims of social movement
actors explicitly. As mentioned in the methodology above, I look at the work of People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), Greenpeace, the Vera Institute for Justice, Stand with
Standing Rock, and the United States Coalition for Palestinian Rights. I analyze their campaigns
to see how their work connects to my study and how and why (or why not) they are taking up
denial in implicit or explicit ways.
Because the topics covered in this dissertation are hard to process, their circumstances
allow them to so often push deeper down in their psyches, out of their lives and consciousness.
This dissertation’s conclusion takes up the process of confronting denial and what social actors
will have to do to confront structural denial. The conclusion also makes the argument that more
psychosocial analysis is needed in sociology, particularly in the study of social change, because
it is necessary to understand how the unconscious is related to the social world. Those who are
concerned about social problems such as those addressed by the organizations analyzed here
must accept the paradox of denial, that one both knows and does not know that one participates
in these structures of oppression—and even more difficult to bear, that the same individuals both
want and do not want these structures to exist. Only in moving past the fantasy that the world is
just, can we start to make it so.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
Whole societies are based on forms of cruelty, discrimination, repression or exclusion
which are “known” about but never openly acknowledged.
—Stanley Cohen, States of Denial1

In this chapter I review much of the existing literature on denial. In examining denial as a
psychological concept, I have limited the scope to psychoanalysis, focusing on both Sigmund
Freud and Anna Freud and contemporary readings of their work. Though denial is very relevant
to Sigmund Freud’s work, he has no explicit examination of the concept, and the reader can only
make inferences through related concepts such as disavowal and repression—however, it should
be noted that in the translation to English, the broadness of the original German term becomes
narrowed. His daughter, Anna Freud, however, does explore denial explicitly in her analysis of
defense mechanisms. After I present the psychological background, I turn to sociologists who
have theorized denial as a sociological concept; in particular I focus on the work of Stanley
Cohen, Eviatar Zerubavel, and Kari Norgaard. Following this, I move to outline specific cases of
denial that scholars have examined. I conclude by showing how my work moves beyond the
previous literature.
PSYCHOLOGICAL DENIAL
I begin this section with Freud, who used the German terms Verneinung (negation) and
Verleurgnung (disavowal), though both can be translated as denial. Sacerdoti and Semi explain
that Freud intended Verneinung to express a repression that had been brought into consciousness
in a disguised form.2 “Thus the subject-matter of a repressed image or thought can make its way
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into consciousness on condition that it is denied. Negation is a way of taking account of what is
repressed; indeed, it is actually a removal of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance
of what is repressed.”3 This is a preconscious process, in contrast to Verleugnung, which is an
unconscious defense mechanism that facilitates the disavowal of external reality. If one is
experiencing Verleugnung, the unconscious disavowal prevents Verneinung from occurring in
the preconscious. It is only in later psychoanalytic work, after Freud, that these two concepts
become more generalized and understood as “denial,” without the specific meaning of negation
or disavowal. In “Fetishism,” Freud does note an important aspect of denial—it is active and not
passive: “In the case we are discussing, on the contrary, we see that the perception has persisted
and that a very energetic action has been exerted to keep up the denial of it.”4 And in “Negation”
he adds, “To deny something in one’s judgement is at bottom the same thing as to say: ‘That is
something that I would rather repress.’”5 It is important to note that even though there are
distinctions among all the concepts, they do not operate in isolation. Chayes points out that
repression and denial assist each other. Chayes also argues that one might in fact think of
repression as a vicissitude of denial.6
Anna Freud takes up denial more explicitly through her analysis of defense mechanisms,
among which is denial. She states:
Psychoanalytic investigation of the problems of defense has developed in the following
way: beginning with the conflicts between the id and the ego institutions (as exemplified
in hysteria, obsessional neurosis, etc.), it passed on to the struggle between the ego and
the superego (in melancholia) and then proceeded to the study of the conflicts between
the ego and the outside world (cf. the infantile animal phobia discussed in Inhibitions,
Symptoms and Anxiety). In all these situations of conflict the person’s ego is seeking to
repudiate a part of his own id. Thus the institution which sets up the defense and the
invading force which is warded off are always the same; the variable factors are the
motives which impel the ego to resort to defensive measures. Ultimately all such
measures are designed to secure the ego and to save it from experiencing unpleasure.
However, the ego does not defend itself only against the unpleasure arising from within.
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In the same early period in which it becomes acquainted with dangerous internal
instinctual stimuli it also experiences unpleasure which has its source in the outside
world. The ego is in close contact with that world, from which it borrows its love.7
For Anna Freud, denial is a reaction to an external danger or unpleasure, whereas repression is a
reaction to an internal dilemma, and “struggling with instinctual stimuli.”8 Denial is not, for
Freud, a neurosis but a normal part of ego development. It is natural to seek an escape from
painful external reality, though in healthy development, children grow to have more agency in
their world and their psyche and thus should not need to engage in defense mechanisms to the
extent the younger child must. “Instead of perceiving the painful impression and subsequently
canceling it by withdrawing its cathexis, it is open to the ego to refuse to encounter the
dangerous external situation at all. It can take to flight and so, in the truest sense of the word,
‘avoid’ the occasions of unpleasure.”9
These psychoanalytic conceptions of denial are important not only for their own field but
also for sociology. I turn now to how sociologists have developed a sociological conception of
denial.
SOCIOLOGICAL DENIAL
In this section I use the work of Stanley Cohen, Eviatar Zerubavel, and Kari Norgaard to
show how sociologists have developed a theory of denial. Much of this work is in the subfield of
cognitive sociology, focusing on how culture shapes human processing and perception of the
world.
States of Denial
Stanley Cohen’s States of Denial is the first book to explicitly lay out a sociological
conception of denial. Cohen states, “Whole societies are based on forms of cruelty,
discrimination, repression or exclusion which are ‘known’ about but never openly
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acknowledged.”10 In this work, Cohen is specifically concerned with human rights violations and
how to make bystanders to suffering and atrocities begin to work toward acknowledgment and
action.
Cohen understands denial as a paradox because it is only ever partial.11 He defines denial
as “a statement about the world or the self (or about your knowledge of the world or your self)
which is neither literally true nor a lie intended to deceive others but allows for the strange
possibility of simultaneously knowing and not-knowing. The existence of what is denied must be
‘somehow’ known, and statements expressing this denial must be ‘somehow’ believed in.”12
He argues that it is necessary to understand denial as a paradox, but many applications of the
concept, outside of psychoanalysis, miss this crucial aspect. For Cohen, a guiding definition of
denial can come from psychoanalysis, particularly Bollas: it is the “need to be innocent of a
troubling recognition.”13
Cohen identifies types for multiple forms of denial. Literal or factual denial is outright
denial—“that did not happen.” Interpretive denial is denial that admits an event occurred but
refuses to interpret the event in a particular way—“yes that happened, but it wasn’t like that.”
Implicatory denial admits that an event occurred and was intended in a certain way but that it
does not matter that it happened. In all of these forms, Cohen argues, denial manifests
cognitively, emotionally, morally, and through (in)action.14
In addition to the different forms of denial, there are multiple levels of denial and
multiple temporalities. Denial can be personal, official, or cultural and can be historical or
contemporary. Personal denial is what individuals do in their personal lives. Official denial is
when a government officially rewrites history—“this event did not occur.” Cultural denial differs
from official denial, though they are both macro forms of denial. Cultural denial is not official
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but consists of culturally agreed-upon “unknowns.” All of these forms of denial can occur about
past events that are either “forgotten” or overtly denied (historical denial) or can manifest in the
present (contemporary denial).15
For Cohen, the antidote to denial is acknowledgment. Acknowledgment is a deliberately
multidefinitional concept distinct from knowledge, though how exactly it is distinct remains
unstated. Knowledge would be part of denial—the knowing to the not-knowing—and it is
therefore insufficient to combat the problem and paradox of denial, “How to convey a reality that
cannot be denied.”16 Acknowledgment is meant to transcend the paradox to a deeper knowing
that would cancel out the “not-knowing.” This acknowledgment remains individual, however, an
individual resistance against cultural denial. In other words, Cohen posits solutions to denial as
though it were additive—many individuals in denial—but does not have solutions for collective
denial—denial that exists as a social fact, beyond just the sum of individual denial. Cohen asserts
the need for collective acknowledgment but struggles to articulate acknowledgments beyond the
level of the individual. “It is your human right not to have to face the truth about yourself; you
can create your favourite fiction and live in blissful self-deception and bad faith. At the political
level, though, we simply cannot tolerate states of denial. There is no room for compromise. Even
if truth telling is not a value in itself, denial must always affect others.”17
His suggestions to combat denial include giving money to organizations that fight for
human rights, a benign form of channeled acknowledgment. Cohen says “let them give in peace”
but does not acknowledge how channeled acknowledgment can still perpetuate denial. For
example, “I donate to Amnesty International and now I am exempt from other responsibilities.”
He also suggests other tools to combat denial, such as bystander intervention trainings, much in
the way first aid and CPR are offered as courses for the general public.18 He also discusses the
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possibility of making literal denial illegal as a possible remedy. The point of these interventions,
however insufficient, is to begin to address that “the gap is between concern and action” because
people are generally concerned and compassionate but lack resources for action.19 Though
Cohen struggles with a solution to the problem, the true contribution of his book is to lay out the
problem of denial as a sociological concern.
Elephants in the Room
Eviatar Zerubavel’s work on denial begins with his interest in cognitive sociology,
attention, and irrelevance. In his book Social Mindscapes one can find the seeds of his more
explicit later work on denial. He states that
when we exclude certain parts of reality from our attention and concern as irrelevant, we
do so not just as human beings but also as social beings. In other words, it is usually as
members of particular thought communities that we ignore certain things. It is our social
environment that normally determines what we attend and ignore. In helping set the
horizons of our attention and concern, it is often society that defines what we consider
relevant.20
Using cognitive sociology, Zerubavel uncovers the social dimension to what people do and do
not perceive and what social beings process as relevant information.
As Zerubavel begins to take on denial explicitly, first in an article and later in a book,
both called The Elephant in the Room, he lays out the social organization of denial. The elephant
in the room is a concept that serves as the social equivalent of denial.
What makes the metaphor of “the elephant in the room” so evocative is the choice of
such a large animal. Unlike a grasshopper on a twig, which we are unable to notice
because it is so well camouflaged that its outlines practically blend with the surrounding
background, the elephant has a commanding visual presence that is objectively
unavoidable. Thus if we manage not to notice it, it can only be as a result of a deliberate
act of ignoring, since naturally it would be practically impossible not to notice it! Not
noticing an elephant, in other words, involves blindness to the obvious.21
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From this theory of elephants, Zerubavel develops a theory of social conspiracies of silence.
Similar to the psychoanalytic perspective, Zerubavel highlights that the process of silence and
denial is active, not passive. This is particularly true because what is denied is often “beg[ing] for
attention.”22 This point is crucial to why Zerubavel uses the elephant metaphor—these are not
subtle matters that are overlooked, they are “highly conspicuous” and require much social and
cognitive work to avoid.23
Through his analysis Zerubavel identifies rules of denial. These include attention,
ignoring, irrelevance, taboo, and tact.24 These rules are not just followed by individuals but are
social processes of what could be called “co-denial.”25 The rules of denial are actually cognitive
and behavioral skills. Attention is shaped by not just one’s physical capacities and senses but by
one’s social environment, and it changes culturally and over time. Through the cultural shaping
of attention, we learn to ignore. Once individuals know how to ignore, they use this tool to shape
what is relevant. While it might be important to notice the outfit one is wearing, one is socialized
to know that the color of the buttons is largely irrelevant. More strict rules about ignoring come
in the form of taboo—prohibitions on what is allowed to be seen and on what information the
social actor should take in. Tact is what Zerubavel identifies as the milder form of taboo,
consisting of subtle guidelines for polite social engagement rather than the strict prohibitions of
taboo.26
From these socially produced rules, Zerubavel turns to the social system to further
examine conspiracies of silence. Proximity to the elephant, and time around the elephant affect
the likelihood of participation in a conspiracy. There is more pressure the closer one gets, and the
longer one is nearby. But it is not just intimacy but also “formal relations and the social
environments that foster them (such as bureaucracy) . . . [that] are more likely to discourage
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openness and thereby promote silence.”27 And unlike ordinary secrets, the more people involved,
the stronger the conspiracy.
Zerubavel’s development of a specifically cognitive sociological understanding of denial
has been instrumental in pushing forward a sociology of denial. Kari Norgaard draws heavily
from Zerubavel to develop a specific analysis of climate change denial while further developing
on Zerubavel and Cohen’s work.
Living in Denial
Norgaard expands on the work of Cohen and Zerubavel through an ethnographic study of
a Norwegian town to uncover the social structure of denial and develop a theory that is relevant
to the United States as well as Norway. What Norgaard does that Cohen and Zerubavel do not is
explicitly bring in the relation between political economy and denial.
Why and how middle-class and wealthy people perpetuate environmental problems is as
important to the field of environmental justice as critical White studies is to the field of
race, or masculinity is to the study of gender. For people of color living on low-lying
Pacific islands or struggling from flooding in New Orleans, the key questions of the
moment may be how to effectively organize to bring attention to their plight and justice
to their lives. For middle-class environmentalists living in wealthy nations like myself,
the key questions look different: Why are so many people in the first world so willing to
live in denial? How is this denial managed? What does it look and feel like? What are its
personal and social consequences?28
Norgaard expands the sociological study of denial to explore how race and class privilege
facilitate its social organization. “Wealthy people are protected from full knowledge of many
environmental and other social problems by national borders, gated communities, segregated
neighborhoods, and their own fine-tuned yet unconscious practices of not noticing, looking the
other way, and normalizing disturbing information.”29 In addition to political economy, Norgaard
analyzes emotions (fear, guilt, and helplessness) and, like Cohen and Zerubavel, culture and
cognition. Norgaard articulates this analysis as a shift away from looking at climate change in an
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information deficit model (we don’t know enough to act) to a social organization of denial.30
“Through a framework of socially organized denial, our view shifts from one in which
understanding of climate change and caring about ecological conditions and our human
neighbors are in short supply to one whereby these qualities are acutely present but actively
muted in order to protect individual identity and sense of empowerment and to maintain
culturally produced conceptions of reality.”31
Norgaard importantly tries to bring political economy and emotions to the discussion of
climate change.32
In blending material from political economy, social psychology, emotions, and culture in
an ethnographic case study, this project clarifies why it makes sense to conceive of denial
as a socially organized rather than merely individual phenomenon. If Zerubavel asserts
that individual acts of avoidance are socially structured, I expand this assertion by
illustrating how what individuals choose to pay attention to or avoid reflects not only
social norms of attention, but also norms of emotion and conversation.33
Through analysis and ethnography, Norgaard adds new concepts to the field of the social
organization of denial: “tools of order,” “tools of innocence,” “moral imagination,” and “the
social construction of innocence.” Tools of order affirm how the world is and should be, and
tools of innocence create distance from responsibility.34 Both of these tools are used in
Norwegian climate change denial but are also general concepts for studying sociological denial.
Moral imagination and the social construction of innocence, too, are generalizable concepts that
emerge from Norgaard’s specific findings. These ideas are grounded in the precarity of late
capitalism, where one must decide to engage in reality or find more and more ways to construct
innocence and distance from the issues.
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SPECIFIC CASES OF DENIAL
In the following section I look to how scholars have examined specific cases of denial.
Not all of the specific cases are examined with a perspective of sociological denial, though many
draw on the work of Cohen and Zerubavel. I will first briefly talk about existential struggles with
death anxiety and then transition to more sociological applications of denial.
Various writers have explored denial of death and aging. The approaches to this
exploration also vary from philosophical to applied psychology. Nietzsche takes up this issue in
his analysis of the denial of life through asceticism in On the Genealogy of Morals and his
critique of Shopenhauer in Beyond Good and Evil.35 Ernest Becker is perhaps the best-known
writer on the topic of denial of death. In this book The Denial of Death, he argues that death
anxiety is universal, and it is sublimated into various forms of civilization. “Man is literally split
in two: he has an awareness of his own splendid uniqueness in that he sticks out of nature with a
towering majesty, and yet he goes back into the ground a few feet in order to blindly and dumbly
rot and disappear forever.”36 In contrast to Becker, Kübler-Ross argues, “denial is usually a
temporary defense and will soon be replaced by partial acceptance.”37
Other scholars have also taken up death through the denial of aging but with a more
contemporary sociopolitical perspective. Gillick argues that members of Western societies
engage in collective denial of aging, preferring to skip from middle age to death, dying
peacefully in their sleep.38 She argues that though denial can be a good thing—a necessary
coping mechanism—denial of aging is so widespread and ingrained as a social practice that it
has become a problem for individuals as well as society, in terms of lack of care and support for
elders. O’Connor argues that not only are elders not supported but “society does not provide a
rite of passage for people entering middle or old age. On the contrary, it systematically ignores
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this transition, focusing further ahead on the already aged. Again we can see the presence of a
collective denial operating here, a denial of the process of ageing and the need to publicly
embrace a new status in society, that of being pre-elderly.”39 He claims most people would rather
deny their prospects of frailty, dependence, and death. This collective denial is the reason
Western culture has no role for the transition to old age.40
Other scholars have written on denial of the death of others, specifically genocides.
Lemarchand’s Forgotten Genocides examines the genocides that have not made it to public
discourse and are not collectively mourned nor acknowledged.41 Auron suggests moving from
Arendt’s banality of evil to thinking through the banality of denial. Banality is important because
it “connotes a lack of originality; it represents boredom, tediousness, and the absence of
creativity. Banality is the extent to which the ‘accepted’ mundane world has infected our
feelings, cognitions, and acts, and how it has influenced our values; it means common,
ordinary.”42 Linking the banal with denial facilitates an understanding of the moral and political
implications of everyday life. “When the majority of a society, or a society as a whole, decides it
would rather do nothing against evil because only then can it continue to survive (in most cases,
even to prosper and flourish in materialist terms), the result is moral collapse. As the twentieth
century repeatedly showed, evil is not just participatory; it also taints those who merely stand by
and observe its spread.”43
Most writers on the topic of denial struggle with the insufficiency of knowledge as a
solution to the problem. Warry poses the question “Why has public awareness of Aboriginal
issues in Canada and Australia failed to translate into political action?”44 This question gets at
the core political problem of denial: awareness is not enough for action. He argues that “in
neither country, despite political rhetoric, are Aboriginal issues such as self-government, land
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claims, treaty renovation, or other critical issues high on the political agenda.”45 This is in part
because “to admit the history is to admit both to a record of racism in the past and to the
possibility of continued racism and discrimination against Aboriginal peoples in the present.”46
He argues it is time to have a genuine acknowledgment, the necessary step toward reconciliation.
Wicks applies a Zerubavelian perspective to animal suffering to the conspiracy of silence around
factory-farmed animals.47 Like Warry she argues that a more genuine acknowledgment is needed
and “to break through the wall of silence and puncture the edifice of denial so that public
attention is directed toward suffering and turned into effective action.”48
Vetlesen ties this problem of lack of action to the problem with the “Enlightenment idea
that knowledge determines action, so that ‘if only people knew, they would act.’”49 In fact, he
argues, drawing on Hamilton, that information deficit is not the problem—as Norgaard argued as
well—but is, rather, a surplus of culture. The problem is that information, the scientific facts,
become “culturalized,” and thus no more important than other aspects of culture. In his example,
ecologically destructive consumption patterns are equally “culturalized,” and thus there is no
incentive to turn climate change information into action.
Vetlesen’s ideas are different from those of other writers on climate change, like
Washington and Cook, who argue “denial is answered by rational thought, so to abandon reason
is to let denial flourish.”50 Washington and Cook suggest postmodernism contributes to climate
change denial, in postmodernist’s question of reason. They put their faith in reason and facts to
get through to people who can then “make a rational assessment of risks” once the facts speak
for themselves.51 Denial is a choice that one can decide not to participate in any longer: “Can we
roll back denial? We can if we choose to.”52
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CONCLUSION
In contrast to ideas about rationality preventing denial, my work turns much more to the
unconscious and the limits of rationality. Many writers on denial, and Norgaard, Zerubavel, and
Cohen specifically, make reference to the unconscious but do not overtly account for it. Much of
this is because psychosocial sociology—a sociology that accounts for the unconscious—is
currently marginalized in the field (see anthology The Unhappy Divorce of Psychoanalysis and
Sociology53). Another reason is that sociology is invested in rationality, hence much of the
critique of postmodernism in writings on denial. Cohen references the fragmented postmodern
self, which is similar to a conception of the psychoanalytic self.54 Writers on denial also cling to
the notion of truth and reality, and both are challenged by postmodernism and psychoanalysis.
This dissertation tries to resist the urge to reinforce theories of objective truth in its analysis of
denial. I therefore devote a chapter to a psychoanalytic reading of denial as a social problem,
engaging with this complicated issue more than others have. For example, Cohen poses the
question “How can we be responsible for things if they are unconscious?” but does not truly take
it up.55 Psychoanalysis, like postmodernism, can be “bad for politics.”56 However, if we as
scholars in this area continue to deny the unconscious because it seriously complicates things, we
are still participating in denial and will not have a theory that truly accounts for the issue.
Similarly, most writers on denial do reference emotions in some way—Norgaard
specifically expanding this discussion beyond the work of Cohen and Zerubavel—but, in doing
so, frame the emotions in a particular way. Previous literature on denial has all maintained that
denial is perpetuated by a resistance to pain and suffering. Norgaard specifically develops her
theory of emotions of denial around this idea; through her ethnography she identifies fear, guilt,
and hopelessness as key emotions in the perpetuation of denial. Though I do not disagree with
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the relevance of these emotions, my analysis uses psychoanalysis to go beyond them. I add to the
literature an account of aggression. In other theories, it is assumed that people are either neutral
to the oppression and suffering of others or, on the other hand, actively wish to see it avoided.
None of the theories entertain the painful but true idea that the average person might also, on an
unconscious level, have aggression toward others. Theorizing aggression does not reduce
people’s entire emotional life to their aggression. When I examine aggression in the psychosocial
chapter, it is not to make the emotion more primary than others. People are also kind and caring.
Aggression, however, is not generally socially accepted. Having aggression is shamed and seen
as antithetical to love and kindness—psychoanalysis makes it clear how both exist together and
are in fact mutually constituting. This unacknowledged aggression, I argue, is absorbed into the
social structure and manifested in social problems.
A second way that my work differs from the existing literature is that I look more closely
at the material conditions of society. In expanding Norgaard’s turn to political economy beyond
its discourses and ideologies to material conditions, I specifically analyze the geography of
society. Cohen, like the other writers, argues that denial manifests emotionally, morally, and
through actions.57 But so far no one has analyzed, or even pointed out, how denial manifests
spatially. That is why I turn to geography to analyze the physical and spatial arrangements of
society and how this both manifests and is manifested by denial.
My work also differs from the previous literature in the examples I engage with. Though
I do analyze climate change, I focus more on how humanity has distanced itself from nature than
on actual climate change denial. The examples I choose are highly contested and yet mundane.
They do not fall under a Zerubavelian conspiracy of silence, per se—as Zerubavel discusses that
incest does, for example—for my examples are structural conditions. Cohen’s work discusses
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nongovernment organizations and their awareness and fundraising campaigns, such as mail
campaigns from Amnesty International. Though denial is certainly relevant to how one may
ignore the plight of a starving child pictured on the envelope soliciting donations, I have used
other more contested examples to highlight the complexity of denial as a sociological
phenomenon, such as contemporary contestations over indigenous sovereignty in the United
States and Canada. Animal rights activists feel very strongly about the unequivocal immorality
of animal slaughter and animal testing, yet most of society feels these actions are necessary to
human existence—people must eat meat and ensure product safety with animal testing. Or
consider how the average American takes prison to be a necessary, though perhaps flawed,
system, and yet there is a growing movement of prison abolitionists. The examples I use are both
everyday and structural conditions.
Part of why I chose these examples is that I want to shift the discussion of denial from the
social organization of denial to how denial is in the social structure itself. Throughout their prior
work, other scholars of denial maintain that the social structure shapes denial in individuals but
do not develop a theory about the social structure itself. The focus stays on denial, and I wish to
turn the focus onto the structure. Other scholars do not explicitly develop a theory of denial as a
social problem at all. By this I mean that it is not just that people deny a social problem but that
denial is part of the structure of society and therefore of all social problems.
Cohen raises this possibility, but he does so at the end of his book and does not dive into
the implications.
The free market of late capitalism—by definition a system that denies its immorality—
generates its own cultures of denial. More people are made superfluous and marginal: the
deskilled, unskilled and sinking poor; the old, who no longer work; the young who cannot
find work; the massive shifting populations of migrants, asylum seekers and refuges. The
“solution” to these problems now physically reproduces the conditions of denial. The
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strategy is exclusion and segregation: enclaves of losers and redundant populations,
living in the modern version of ghettos, remove enough to become “out of sight, out of
mind”, separated from enclaves of winners, in their guarded shopping malls, gated
communities and retirement villages.58
Though Cohen raises this important point, he does not centralize the structural racism and global
capitalism that has led to the atrocities they focus on. In a sense, I move back the analysis to
conditions that precede the atrocities and bystanders that Cohen analyzes. With this analysis of
structural denial, I show how “sympathy commitment and action” are not enough, as Cohen
suggests as a remedy.59 If denial is truly a structural problem, it must be addressed structurally,
as I argue in this work, on the scales of geography, cognition, and the unconscious. The
following three chapters each analyze denial on those respective scales.
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Chapter Three
Out of Sight: Distancing and Denial

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social
existence that determines their consciousness.
—Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”1

This chapter takes up denial with materiality, specifically space and geography, as its
starting point. How does denial manifest spatially, and how do spatial arrangements manifest
denial? In this chapter I first articulate how I understand the sociospatial paradigm with which I
analyze the relationship of denial to the physical environment. Next, I move through the forms of
denial that occur in the contested social problems in patterns of containment, exclusion, and
elimination, in cases such as the killings and isolation of Native Americans, the West Bank
Barrier, the geography of prisons and jails, the spatial arrangements of slaughterhouses, and how
society processes waste and trash. Following this discussion, I engage with the strengths and
limits of this paradigm of analysis.
HOW DISTANCING FACILITATES DENIAL
Though denial permeates all aspects of social existence, as Cohen notes, spatial
metaphors form the vocabulary of denial: compartmentalization, bracketing, isolation, putting
knowledge aside, splitting.2 What, though, would it mean if these were not just metaphors but the
actual material arrangements of society? Many scholars begin their analysis of the social world
with spatial arrangements, but almost none do so in order to understand denial. I draw on varied
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work that highlights social problems spatially to illustrate how denial, like other aspects of
society and culture, is manifested in sociospatial arrangements.
Norbert Elias argued that western civilization is premised on the practice of “distancing
and concealment of morally and physically repugnant practices rather than their elimination or
transformation.”3 The entire built environment is based on not having to see things people do not
want to deal with. From the location of prisons and asylums to those of bathrooms and laundry
rooms, environments are built and space produced so that those who do not have to see certain
things will not see them. One could expand Elias’s argument to include anything society deems a
problem. This distancing often masks the denial of social problems as solutions to the problem.
Hide it away, put it out of sight, problem solved. It has become such common practice to conceal
problems that these practices are thought to be actual solutions. But distancing and concealment
do not transform or eliminate problems; they just allow observers to pretend this to be the case.
The French Marxist Henri Lefebvre argued that “(social) space is a (social) product . . .
the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action . . . in addition to being a
means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power.”4 Social
actors work out their mental concerns through their engagement with and modification of nature
and their built environment. The design of cities and countries and national borders is not
arbitrary; borders don’t just appear, and thus, conditions, like who lives in which places, are
socially produced. The social construction of space reciprocates those efforts, shaping how
inhabitants understand the world that they are living in. How space is structured is literally about
the very foundation, the very ground, that its occupants stand on as a society and as individuals.
My argument is that denial is such a part of society that particularly in the United States societal
structure is wholly set up to facilitate not having to see, not having to pay attention, so that
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Americans can ignore social conditions—so that Americans can be in denial. This manifests in
many different ways, including the way space is used and produced to facilitate social denial.
Structuring denial into subjects’ engagement with space has become a ubiquitous part of social
arrangements.
The way socioeconomic problems manifest geographically is, for Neil Smith, a
systematic feature of capitalism integral to the mode of production.5 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, in
agreement with Smith, also understands these problems to appear both materially and
ideologically as crises interlock with land, labor, and state.6 Capital must be invested in the built
environment to expand capital, but it must also be shifted around and withdrawn to find higher
rates of profit.7 This uneven development that Smith describes is also observed by Ashley
Dawson: “Global political economy is patently moving in the opposite direction, towards a world
order characterized by higher walls and novel forms of apartheid. Indeed, such a regime of
inequality is highly productive to capital, which profits greatly from the wage differentials
created by the artificial geographic barriers erected by the state.”8 These physical barriers
continue to facilitate hiding social conditions out of sight. Gilmore claims that “from the
genocidal wars against Native Americans to the totalitarian chattel slavery perpetrated on
Africans, to colonial expansion, to the obliteration of radical anti-racist and anti-capitalist
movements, the annals of US history document a normatively aggressive, crisis-driven state.”
The way the state has sought to “solve” these crises has been through identification, control, and
violent elimination of “enemies.” Problems are “solved” by trying to eliminate the sight of the
problem.9 I now look at how this problem manifests itself more specifically.
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SPATIAL VIOLATIONS
Contested social problems that I discuss in this dissertation are those that are argued by
some to violate a moral right to spatial and bodily autonomy. In this chapter I explore three
spatial examples of each violation, primarily focusing on settler colonialism, Israeli apartheid,
mass incarceration, industrialized animal slaughter, and environmental destruction. In analyzing
these cases, I have identified three common patterns of violation: containment, exclusion, and
elimination.
Containment
I first look at examples of containment—these include efforts to limit the spatial freedom
of certain groups by containing them to certain spaces. One very overt example is the West Bank
Barrier, a quite literal mechanism of containment. In 2002, Israel began the construction of the
West Bank Barrier, the most expensive domestic project Israel had undertaken. This barrier
comprised “a complex network of electronically sensitive fencing, stacked barbed-wire coils,
concrete walls, watchtowers, ditches, patrol roads, and trace roads for detecting footprints.” In
contrast to the barriers that enclose Gaza, the West Bank Barrier is built on the Palestinian side
of the 1949 Green Line. Though there was Palestinian as well as international opposition, the
project went on to completion.10 The physical geography of Israel and its boundaries are
manifestations of exclusions. According to Dayan, Israel has implemented a permanent state of
emergency in which “brute force coexists with, to a sometimes calamitous degree, a systemic
practice of discrimination, surveillance, and disappearance. Behind the barriers—and they are
everywhere—live the confined, sealed off from the zone of inclusion, the Israeli state.”11 Israel
used physical barriers and geography to uphold the system of exclusion of Palestinians through
this containment, which is a system of apartheid.
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Ashley Dawson argues that apartheid is not a metaphor for social relations, and it is not
something to be used loosely. Rather it is a specific set of policies that apply to Israel, though not
in the same way as it did in South Africa. He argues the first key element of apartheid in Israel is
a series of laws and policies that distinguish between Jews and non-Jews. Jews are granted not
just preferred legal status but also material benefits. These material benefits are produced largely
through the second key element of Israeli apartheid: policies that are designed to spatially
fragment Palestinian territories and thereby produce geographical occupation and domination.12
Sociospatial forms of containment facilitate the production of open-air prisons for Palestinian
people and material oppression that is pushed out of sight, literally behind walls.
In the United States, the ghetto may not have a militarized physical barrier, but
segregation operates in a similar way. In American Apartheid Massey and Denton13 shift from
previous accounts of race that first sought to find race in the body14 and later in culture,15 to
looking at how race occurs in space. In contrast to scholars like William Julius Wilson, Massey
articulates that the pernicious concentration of poverty in US cities is about racial (and racist)
segregation, rather than middle class minorities leaving communities of color. “Segregation acts
to concentrate poverty” through a “a spatially isolated underclass of persistently poor minority
families.”16 Massey and Denton’s work demonstrates that class, race, and space cannot be
understood adequately apart from each other. “If racial segregation concentrates poverty in
space, it also focuses and exacerbates any change in the economic status of minority groups. In a
segregated environment, an exogenous economic shock that causes a downward shift in the
distribution of minority income . . . will not only bring about an increase in the poverty rate in
the group as a whole; it will also cause an increase in the geographic concentration of poverty.”17
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Loïc Wacquant expands the discussion of containment from the ghetto to the continuum
of containment between the ghetto and prison. He explores the dynamic exchanges between class
inequality, particularly ghettoization, and the racialized prison system in what he terms the
“carceral continuum.”18 In the United States, physical space has also been divided up,
particularly between blacks and whites, sometimes legally as in the case of Jim Crow laws in the
south and sometimes simply de facto through redlining and public housing policies.19 For
Wacquant, the ghetto is the result of the decades of varied segregation policies and
refers to the concrete experiences and relationships of its occupants, not to the underlying
ties that firmly anchor them in the metropolitan ensemble—albeit in exclusionary
fashion. Indeed . . . there exist deep-seated causal and functional linkages between the
transformation of the ghetto and structural changes that have redrawn the visage of the
US economy, social space and field of power in reaction to the shock of the progressive
movements of the 1960s.20
Wacquant explains that these forced separations go beyond housing to other basic institutions
like schools, political representation, public services, and employment.21 These separations then
functionally contain the separated populations. And of course policing and rates of incarceration
also drastically vary by spatial location.
The spatial concentration of poverty is connected to the huge increase in prisons that has
taken place since the 1980s. Gilmore explains that
the expansion of prison constitutes a geographical solution to socio-economic problems,
politically organised by the state which is itself in the process of radical restructuring.
This view brings the complexities and contradictions of globalisation home, by showing
how already existing social, political and economic relations constitute the conditions of
possibility (but not inevitability) for ways to solve major problems. In the present
analysis “major problems” appear, materially and ideologically, as surpluses of finance
capital, land, labour and state capacity that have accumulated from a series of
overlapping and interlocking crises stretching across three decades.22
Focusing specifically on the rapid development of prisons in California, Gilmore highlights these
connections among geography, the state, and prison by situating prison expansion in the
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political-economic geography of globalization. Gilmore explains that the expansion of prisons in
the United States is an extension of a dynamic of uneven global development.23 This method of
containment, however, is a part of the larger project of exclusion from the body politic, which I
will discuss next.
Exclusion
Exclusion, in the sense that will be discussed in this chapter, is a paradox. What or whom
is excluded from a society remains necessary to that society’s functioning but without full
recognition or benefit from this participation. The labor of those excluded is particularly
relevant. Andrea Smith connects the colonization of Africa to the colonization of the United
States, arguing that Native Studies are often problematically articulated differently from Black
Studies, the first being concerned with colonization and the latter with race. This, however,
Smith argues, is a product of antiblackness in that the colonization of Africa is disappeared, and
thus Africa appears as “ontologically colonized,” always already the property of Europe.
Through the disavowal of colonization, black people can be produced as having the ontological
condition of being property of the settler state. She contrasts this with the understanding of native
peoples as discoverable objects of nature. Citing Kiristina Gail Sailiata’s work, Smith points out
the problems with differentiating discussions of land and resources from labor, as is often the
case in Native Studies and Black Studies. As she explains,
The formulation of stolen labor versus stolen land obscures the fact that it is the
disappearance of Indigenous labor that both justifies stealing Indigenous lands, as well as
rendering the work of Black peoples as non-labor. Furthermore, this relationship between
Black fungibility and the disappearance of Indigenous labor rests on the commodification
of land as property that then prescribes the terms of anti-colonial struggle safely within
the confines of nation-state governance.24
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The exclusion of those whose labor is then exploited is also part of the condition of mass
incarceration. Though geographically, prisons and those incarcerated within them are often
placed away from heavily populated areas—as though not integral to society—incarcerated
people play a central part in social organizations as the prison industrial complex is tied to almost
all aspects of culture and government. As discussed above, Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s work
highlights how much the growth of prisons in the last 30 years has been tied to economic
situations and not to crime.25 The locations of prisons are tied to economics, particularly labor,
though they also often play in to the fantasy of the extrication of criminality from society. In
former coal mining regions, where natural resources have been depleted as mountain tops have
been “removed,” supermax prisons are now being built in ecologically precarious locations.
Providing jobs to former miners, as well as extracting free labor from those incarcerated, is now
a practice in Virginia and Kentucky. Wallens Ridge prison in Virginia, for example, was built to
replace the mining industry, and the prison was filled with incarcerated people brought in from
all over the country. Private prison companies build these prisons and guarantee that beds will be
filled to guarantee industry for the location. Prison and incarceration generally are inextricably
tied to labor and capitalism yet are masked as solutions to crime.
Gilmore highlights the false promises made in the state of California. Prisons are
promised as a recession-proof and nonpolluting industry that would bring jobs to areas depressed
by other industries that were exploitative of land and labor. Yet the creation of prisons has not
resulted in jobs or other improvements.26 Prison development can also bring more representation
to these towns by padding the population numbers. Although prison populations are counted for
legislative purposes, however, they are not counted by the Environmental Protection Agency
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when approving permits. This has contributed to a national trend in which new prisons are built
on land that is toxic to both incarcerated people and prison staff.
We thus have a fantasy of exclusion; for the idea of locking people away is itself a form
of denial masked as a solution to a problem. It is clearly a way of not dealing with someone.
Instead of exploring how to deal with the problems that produced “the criminal,” the marked
people are locked away. Among those pieces of legislation that speak to how denial is part of
mass incarceration are Three Strikes laws. In baseball, after three strikes, you’re out. The fantasy
that, and desire for, society to move people out of it is strong. Three convictions and one is
kicked out, and a great deal of spatial work is done to facilitate that illusion. But of course it is
exactly this: an illusion of removal.
As Wacquant and Travis both note, the increase in incarceration in the United States
since the first Bush presidency has also increased the number of people released from prison
with few job prospects.27 Wacquant argues that:
in the post-Civil Rights era, the remnants of the dark ghetto and the fast-expanding
carceral system of the United States have become tightly linked by a triple relationship of
functional equivalency, structural homology, and cultural fusion. This relationship has
spawned a carceral continuum that ensnares a supernumerary population of younger
black men, who either reject or are rejected by the deregulated low-wage labor market, in
a never-ending circulus between the two institutions. . . . It also plays a pivotal role in the
remaking of “race” and the redefinition of the citizenry via the production of a racialized
public culture of vilification of criminals.28
Wacquant adds that though many people know of this dynamic relationship between urban
poverty and incarceration, the situation is still largely ignored, and analysts and policy makers
seem not to register the impact imprisonment has on low-income black communities.29 Here
again it is apparent how denial of the actuality of the situation allows for the continuations of
“solutions” that address problems only partially.
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One overt and obvious example of structuring the environment to hide a social problem
away is, first, that prisons are built at all, and second, that they are built in remote locations.
There is an attempt by the carceral state to hide away the social problems in society, like racism
and poverty, through the creation of prisons. Rather than being the problem, those incarcerated
suffer doubly from social problems—first as victims of the problem and then as victims of the
so-called solution. Ross notes that within the rise of the supermax prisons and increased
incarceration, punishment is increasingly meted out beyond the public view, hidden inside these
large, bureaucratic state-run structures called jails and prisons.30
Michelle Alexander, much in line with Gilmore and Wacquant, argues that the denial of
the severity of the problem of mass incarceration is “facilitated by persistent racial segregation in
housing and schools, by political demagoguery, by racialized media imagery, and by the ease of
changing one’s perception of reality simply by changing television channels. . . . Those confined
to prisons are out of sight, out of mind; once released they are typically confined to ghettos.”32
Providing even more evidence for Wacquant’s theory of the carceral continuum, Alexander
highlights the spatial dynamic of mass incarceration, which she says
achieves racial segregation by segregating prisoners—the majority of whom are black
and brown—from mainstream society. Prisoners are kept behind bars typically more than
100 miles from home. Even prisons—the actual buildings—are a rare sight for many
Americans, as they are often located far from population centers. Although rural counties
contain only 20 percent of the U.S. prison population, 60 percent of new prison
construction occurs there. Prisoners are thus hidden from public view—out of sight, out
of mind. . . . Bars and walls keep hundreds of thousands of black and brown people away
from mainstream society—a form of apartheid unlike any the world has seen.”33
Wacquant calls this segregation via the ghetto an institution of forced confinement, a social
prison that operates alongside judicial prisons.34
A ghetto is essentially a sociospatial device that enables a dominant status group in an
urban setting to simultaneously ostracize and exploit a subordinate group endowed with
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negative symbolic capital, that is, an incarnate property perceived to make contact with
members of the category degrading by virtue of what Max Weber calls a “negative social
estimation of honor.” Put differently, the ghetto is the materialization of a relation of
ethnoracial control and closure built out of four elements: (i) stigma, (ii) constraint, (iii)
territorial confinement, and (iv) institutional encasement. The resulting formation is a
distinctive space, containing an ethnically homogenous population, which finds itself
forced to develop within it a set of interlinked institutions that duplicates the
organizational framework of the broader society from which that group is banished and
supplies the scaffoldings for the construction of its specific “style of life” and social
strategies. This parallel institutional nexus affords the subordinate group a measure of
protection, autonomy, and dignity, but at the cost of locking it in a relationship of
structural subordination and dependency. The ghetto, in short, operates as an ethnoracial
prison.35
A manifestation of Wacquant’s analysis appears in the case of New York City. The
policing of the black and brown community in New York City leads to the filling of Rikers
Island jail, built on a toxic waste landfill and a hazardous place for the population forced to live
there.36 Rikers, which is a jail and not a prison, holds a large percentage of people awaiting trial
who have not been convicted. In 2015, it was reported that Rikers contained over 400 people
who had been locked up for more than two years awaiting trial, with no conviction, and six
people who had been kept on pending cases for more than six years.37 Michael Jacobson, a
former correction commissioner who currently heads the Institute for State and Local
Governance at the City University of New York, has stated that in the last 20 years New York
courts have taken longer and longer to resolve felony cases, even as the number of cases has
declined.38 A viscerally disturbing example of the consequences of keeping people locked up in
these conditions, is Kalief Browder and his tragic suicide after spending three years as a teenager
locked up pretrial in Rikers Island. Kalief suffered abuse by guards on multiple occasions.
Unable to recover from the trauma, Kalief killed himself after multiple earlier suicide attempts.39
Part of the problem is Rikers Island’s spatial arrangement: it is literally an island apart
from the rest of the city. Rikers, made invisible in myriad ways, is not identified on New York
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City subway maps. A new guerilla campaign called #SeeRikers seeks to address this by placing
clear stickers printed in red with “RIKERS IS HERE” on the subway maps. Estefanía Acosta de
la Peña, Laura Sánchez, and Misha Volf, Design Studies students at the Parsons School of
Design, explain that their project is meant to highlight that Rikers Island’s absence on the maps
is “emblematic of a broader cultural willingness to overlook the places, policies, and practices
that support the systemic violence of mass incarceration.”40 But of course it is not just
emblematic; the geographic structure is not just a symbol of the cultural willingness to allow for
mass incarceration but is part and parcel of it.
Bill DeBlasio, the mayor of New York, and Andrew Cuomo, governor of the state of
New York have differing opinions on what to do about Rikers. Cuomo said in an interview that
New Yorkers need to “admit that Rikers, as it is, doesn’t work and admit that it should be closed
down, that’s step one, and then we’ll get to step two,” but DeBlasio has said the city “does not
have a viable pathway to that at this point” and added, “Where are you going to put them? How
are you going to pay for them?”41 DeBlasio is clearly committed to denial through distancing:
there needs to be a place to hide them away. And if not Rikers, where?
Melissa Mark-Viverito, New York City Council speaker, said, “Rikers Island has come to
represent our worst tendencies, and our biggest failures. . . . For too long, Rikers has stood not
for more justice, but for revenge. We must explore how we can get the population of Rikers to be
so small that the dream of shutting it down becomes a reality.”42 Norman Seabrook, president of
the Correction Officers Benevolent Association, added that “no one is volunteering to build a jail
in their district or on Park Avenue.”43 Seabrook and Mark-Viverito seem to see what DeBlasio
does not, namely that what is needed is not a new place to hide people away but a rethinking of
incarceration.
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This logic of exclusion extends beyond humans to the land, the earth, and nonhuman
animals, as well. Humans’ alienation from nature and from their own nature is a denial effected
by colonialism, capitalism, and spatial arrangements. Given the connections between Western
disavowal of nature through the genocide of native people, in part for their ties to nature, it is no
surprise that it is hard for US society to grapple with its effects on the climate. The effects of
capitalism on the earth can go largely unseen by most people in the United States. Western
privileges allow most Americans not to have to engage with their waste, through excluding it
from sight, and to produce the illusion of a separation from nature. People in cities talk about
getting out of town to go be in nature—lakes and forests—but fail to see that cities are part of
nature as well, and what happens in cities is connected to the larger ecosystems.
Those of us who live in houses that exist separate from nature do not see ourselves as
integrated into nature. We try to keep bugs out of our apartments. Within our homes we separate
space so as not to have to see our waste—we have toilets that flush away waste, trash that
magically gets taken off the curb after we go to sleep and before we leave for work in the
morning. In NYC the sewer system is actually far from invisible but is constructed to appear so.
It consists of 6,000 miles of pipes, 135,000 sewer catch basins, ninety-three pump stations, and
fourteen massive sewage treatment plants and requires a staff of 6,000 and $2 billion a year just
to maintain. As one may suspect, however, when the system is no longer invisible, the burden of
the city’s waste falls disproportionately on poor and minority neighborhoods.44
Garbage also requires complex processes to create the illusion that it has disappeared.
Most New Yorkers take for granted the 7,200 people in 2,000 trucks who take 10,000 tons of
trash and 1,500 tons of recyclables every day. In 1895 street cleaning was overhauled and given
a military structure and hierarchy that had trash collectors wear white uniforms to cultivate the
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image of cleanliness. Still, the trash was just dumped into the ocean until 1934, despite having
been illegal since the 1880s; it continued because New York City politicians could not figure out
what else to do—the city literally could not confront the problem of its own waste. After 1934
the city used landfills until they were all filled up. Now 85 percent of trash is exported out of the
city at a cost of $300 million a year.45 Most people do not know where their trash goes; they do
not see the long process of biodegradation and do not have to immediately deal with the
consequences of all of the nonbiodegradable products and packaging the developed world uses.
Very few people have to confront the Great Pacific Garbage Patch, twice the size of Texas, in the
Pacific Ocean. This garbage patch largely consists of tiny pieces of plastic, which never actually
biodegrades and instead just breaks into smaller and smaller pieces.46
Of course, everyone on the planet will have to face the long-term consequences. Žižek
states this similarly when identifying ecology and disavowal as the crucial aspect of
understanding ideology today:
I think ecology, the way we approach the ecological problematic is maybe the crucial
field of ideology today. . . . But why don’t we do anything about it. It is, I think, a nice
example of what in psychoanalysis we call disavowment. The logic is that of, “I know
very well, but I act as if I don’t know.” Precisely in the case of ecology, I know very well
there may be global warming, everything will explode and be destroyed. But after
reading a treatise on it, what do I do? I step out, I see not [trash], but I see nice trees,
birds singing, and even if I know rationally all this is in danger, I simply do not believe
that all this can be destroyed.47
The likelihood that you walk outside and see trash and waste reflects your position in the
sociospatial arrangements of society.
This also applies to how much one engages in the needs of physical reproduction
generally, and specifically in the production of meat. Not only is industrialized slaughter harmful
to the animals who die violent deaths, but it is also incredibly dangerous work for employees.
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Workers regularly suffer amputations; machines such as skinners, band saws, wing saws, and
hide grippers resulted in thirty-four injuries at ten of Tyson Foods’ meatpacking plants in just the
first nine months of 2015. Each week Tyson, America’s biggest meat producer, “processes” 35
million chickens, 400,000 hogs, and 128,000 cattle.48 To conceptualize the extent of these
figures, in 2009, there were 1.6 billion wild birds in Europe (this includes all species together).
Yet 1.9 billion chickens were raised in Europe in 2009 for food.49 This kind of labor, as a part of
the industry, is also toxic to the environment. While 195 countries at COP21, the United Nations
2015 Climate Change Conference, pledged to pursue “efforts to limit the temperature increase to
1.5 degrees Celsius” and gradually reduce emissions, there was no acknowledgment that animal
agriculture is responsible for over half of those emissions, nor that 80 percent of deforestation in
the Amazon and about 14 percent of the world’s total annual deforestation is also a result of
animal agriculture.50
In slaughterhouses, the work of killing is excluded from even the workers. Pachirat’s
brilliant analysis of industrialized slaughterhouses illustrates how spatial arrangements help to
maintain what I would call a split in the workers’ egos and allow for one who works and even
handles the flesh of dead cows not to see the violence. Through a first-hand account of working
in various jobs at an industrialized slaughterhouse, Pachirat describes the spatial mechanisms
that assist in this split for the workers. The cows are brought to the slaughterhouse in trucks and
delivered into a cattle pen. From there, they are put through a (dis)assembly line, first to the “kill
floor,” then to the cooler, then to a separate space for fabrication, and finally the shipping dock at
the other end of the factory. Even on the kill floor, the moment of death is isolated; it remains
somewhat unclear and variable from animal to animal which worker has actually done the
killing. First, the knocker puts a bolt in the cow’s head. Then, separately, the indexer may have
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to do a second, more gun-like, shot into the cow’s head as he spaces out the animals on the line.
Next, the presticker and the sticker slash the animal’s throat, a first cut by the presticker and a
second deeper slash by the sticker. Pachirat makes clear that the workers’ positions are all
separate; only the sticker and presticker can see each other. Following this, the animals are
electrocuted in order to have one last final surge of blood pumped prior to entering the “bleed
pit.” At this point, the animal is supposed to be dead, but sometimes workers ever farther down
the line will take the act that finally brings death.51
Pachirat’s ethnography of a slaughterhouse is, in his own accounting, a work that
precisely explores Norbert Elias’s phenomenon of distancing that grounds Western civilization—
i.e., “a labor considered morally and physically repellent by the vast majority of society that is
sequestered from view rather than eliminated or transformed”52—as the killing of animals is
hidden even from most of the workers in the slaughterhouse. In thinking through alienation and
estrangement as Marx articulated these concepts, the slaughterhouse seems to be the perfect
example of the problems with labor under capitalism. Factory farming and industrialized
slaughter would not be possible without the denial of species being. This kind of labor, like most
assembly line labor, divorces the relationship between nature and laborer.
Elimination
The tools of exclusion can lead to even more serious consequences—elimination. This
was the project of Nazi Germany and is entering the rhetoric of the United States with Trump’s
ban on Muslims. This scenario undoes the paradox of exclusion wherein the excluded are
nonetheless integral to society. In elimination, society can tip the paradoxical balance of
exclusion to its extreme. Here, I explore how this dynamic manifested in the elimination and
genocide of Native Americans. There are countless examples of native elimination, one of which
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is the story of Yosemite National Park. A popular understanding of national parks is that they are
preserved spaces of land, but this erases the often violent displacement of the Natives that
inhabited the land before its “preservation.” Yosemite was known as Ahwahnee to the
Ahwahneechee Indians. California soldiers eliminated the Ahwahneechee from the land during
the Mariposa War in 1851. To survive and stay in their homeland, the Ahwahneechee returned to
take employment as “Indian performers.” This went on until 1968 when, during a fire-fighting
drill, their remaining homes were burned down and they were finally completely evicted from
the land.53 National parks like Yosemite are socially produced products of settler colonialism,
which violently eliminated its inhabitants but produce the image of having preserved a natural
condition, thus eliminating an acknowledgment of that condition’s own violent production.
Patrick Wolfe’s explication of the logic of elimination frames settler colonialism as a
grounding mechanism of society that applies not only to when the land was first colonized but to
how this process continues to the present. Wolfe focuses on the logic of elimination that often
results in genocide in settler colonialist societies like the United States. Arguing that “settler
colonialism is inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal,” Wolfe’s work highlights the
denial in the process of settler colonialism. “Indigenous North Americans were not killed, driven
away, romanticized, assimilated, fenced in, bred White, and otherwise eliminated as the original
owners of the land but as Indians.”54 Morgensen extends Wolfe’s theory by noting that “the
‘logic of elimination’ constitutes settler colonialism in the genocide and amalgamation of
Indigenous peoples, by indicating that this also indigenises and naturalises white settler nations
as projections of the West.”55 In this way, the physical and cultural elimination of Indigenous
people allows for white settlers to naturalize their establishment on native lands: “Settler
colonialism does not simply replace native society tout court. Rather, the process of replacement
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maintains the refractory imprint of the native counter-claim. This phenomenon is not confined to
the realm of symbolism.”56 The denial of the native through the logic of elimination primarily
unfolds spatially.
Wolfe explains that settler colonialism is premised on a logic of elimination because it
aims to secure and maintain territory, and one way or another the original owners or occupants of
the territory must be eliminated. He notes that assimilation can be even more effective than mass
killings, but “the resort to mass killings can reflect the proclaimed inassimilability of the victim
group, as in the case of Jews in relation to the ‘Aryan’ blood stock”57 or the “failed assimilation”
of the Cherokees as was the case in the United States leading to their removal in what is known
now as the Trail of Tears. Through Wolfe’s analysis, it becomes clear that physicality and
geography are important parts in facilitating a mental process of belonging and exclusion that
will be taken up itself in the next chapter.
The disavowal of the colonization of both Africa and North America is foundational to
the structure of contemporary US society. Audra Simpson highlights this disavowal when she
argues that most discourses of settler colonialism assume that it is, in fact, settled. Without
complete extermination and genocide, how could it be settled? And even then it is not possible to
simply move on from the legacy of founding a society on genocide and extermination.58
CONCLUSION
Although all the scholars I have discussed in this chapter tackle important issues, none
except Žižek and, Michelle Alexander briefly, addresses denial. I wish to highlight, however, this
unspoken common thread that weaves through these diverse social problems. I am interested in
the paradox of denial: humans build things out of sight but are still the ones who build them.
What these theories do not account for is how people and communities manage to set up physical
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systems of denial—physically build them—and yet still not see them even when they come into
sight. What this sociospatial paradigm does not explain is that denial depends on knowing and
not knowing; that this is true can be seen very clearly in this chapter but not the reasons why. To
talk about denial one must go deeper than just the material spatial arrangements so as to address
socially constructed understandings of the world.
Moving from the evidence in this chapter that geography aids denial, I must now move to
how geography is built with intention to deny. And this means Marx was not fully correct about
material existence shaping consciousness—there is a reciprocal relationship. Michelle Alexander
sees this too when she articulates that few Americans recognize that every year hundreds of
thousands of people are swept through the prison system because the systemic discrimination
and exclusion are rationalized. She states that the collective denial is not merely inconvenient but
a major block to transformation and a true understanding of race in society. The sociospatial
aspects of denial cannot come into existence without discursive structures that produce the
conditions of the “criminal other,” for example.59 This can expand beyond race to apply to major
blocks to any kind of social transformation. As Bauman has said, “The method of territorial and
functional separation is deployed both outwardly and inwardly.”60 In the next chapter I move
from the outward manifestation of sociospatial division to look at how denial manifests inwardly,
in a sociomental account of patterns of denial.
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Chapter Four
Out of Mind: Categories and Denial

We do not understand except in thinking through concepts. But sensory reality is not cut
out to enter spontaneously and by itself the framework of our concepts. It resists this, and
to make it pliant with it, we must force it to some extent, submit it to all sorts of laborious
operations that alter it to make it assimilable by the mind, and we never manage to
triumph completely over its resistance.
—Durkheim, The Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Conditions1

This chapter explores denial through classification and categorization. It is about the
work of consciousness; this is not mutually exclusive from the geographic divisions discussed in
the previous chapter. But scholars with this approach have a different starting point. The
previous chapter explored spatial differentiations as a layer of denial. In this chapter, I present a
cognitive approach to how denial operates sociologically—what I call the sociomental paradigm.
This chapter follows the process of denial through epistemic violations constructed through ideas
of dominion, identity, and dehumanization, in particular contested social problems: American
nationalist identity production; the production of the “other” in the context of Israel and
Palestine; the production of criminality as a racialized phenomenon that manifests in the schoolto-prison pipeline; the sociomental production of animals as meat; and the split between nature
and the social, particularly in the context of disasters. Following the discussion of these
examples, the benefits and limitations of the sociomental framework are highlighted for
sociology, generally, and the study of denial, specifically.
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HOW CATEGORIES FACILITATE DENIAL
In the first chapter, I talked about physically building walls; this chapter is about
cognitively putting up walls, so to speak. In the face of knowledge that is difficult to bear,
humans build cognitive walls. This is not always a moral issue on the individual level. It is hard
to know what to do with information about suffering, as Stanley Cohen elaborates in his book on
denial: because of this, “every personal life and every society is built on denial.”2 There are
gradations between watching one’s Jewish neighbors being taken to concentration camps and
tossing a piece of mail about starving children into the recycling bin, and indeed Cohen
highlights the various ways to be a bystander to suffering. Much is happening cognitively to
allow for inaction.
Erving Goffman’s understanding of the social production of cognition is seen through his
examination of what people do and do not take in—or, as he puts it, what is in and out of the
frame. One of Goffman’s many examples of how people take in information differently
depending on the frame is a stream of print flashed along the bottom of a television screen with,
for example, a weather announcement. There is a capacity to take in the TV show and the
weather announcement at the same time. For Goffman, this illustrates how both attention and
cognition can be split in (at least) two.3 This splitting of cognition applies not only to the takingin of media but to social activity. Goffman explains that boundary markers or brackets are both
spatial and temporal; they function like a picture frame in that they “are presumably neither part
of the content of activity proper nor part of the world outside the activity but rather both inside
and outside, a paradoxical condition already alluded to and not to be avoided just because it
cannot easily be thought about clearly.”4 Goffman clearly establishes the possibility of split
cognition as a practice of everyday life.

-65-

Whereas Goffman’s focus is on the mechanisms that render something out of frame,
Eviatar Zerubavel is more interested in how attention is structured within the frame. For
example, it is not just that one pays attention to what is in the frame and not outside of it (the
gallery wall) but that one pays attention to the apple in the painting and not to the brush strokes
that compose the still life.5 In a sense, Zerubavel goes beyond Goffman in not only saying that
individuals are able to split their cognition in two but that they also make judgments about what
they perceive as relevant and irrelevant; this division functions through social delineations. He
argues that “despite the fact that we often regard what we essentially ignore when we focus our
attention on something as irrelevant or ‘extraneous,’ nothing is inherently irrelevant or
extraneous.”6
Inattention is not a moral problem, per se, but part of society. When people put something
out of frame and out of mind, they genuinely can no longer know it. The depth of this split
between knowing something one minute and not knowing it another minute is such that it is not
about simply forgetting. Social cognition, the sociomental aspects of thought, facilitates this split
between attention and inattention. Consequently, for Zerubavel, attention and inattention are
sociomental mechanisms of classifying and dividing the world. Attention is “arguably the most
important organizing feature of our conscious life.”7 Visibility is therefore not a trait of a
physical properties but rather the extent to which attention is paid to it. Attention, through
noticing and ignoring, are sociomental acts that are socially produced through culture. “We are
socialized into culturally, subculturally (ideologically, professionally), and historically specific
norms, conventions, and traditions of attending that actually determine what we come to regard
as attention-worthy and what we effectively ignore.”8 This particular socialization feeds denial.

-66-

When Cohen writes about denial he specifies there are different ways that people deny.
Factual denial, the most overt form, is when someone says directly that something did not
happen. Interpretive denial is slightly more nuanced—one can admit that something happened
but argue that it did not happen exactly like that or it did not mean what others think it meant.
These both can happen through either conscious lying or unconscious denial. A third way that
one can deny is through reframing cognition, emotion, and morality: I did not know it, I did not
feel that way about it, it was not wrong. Through these typologies of denial Cohen makes clear
that denial is not simple. As he explains, through a cognitive approach, the language of denial
sometimes does not even include the word denial itself, and certainly not psychoanalytic terms
like repression. Cohen says instead that denial is often discussed as “perception without
awareness.” In this way of speaking, much as Goffman and Zerubavel have shown, denial is
understood through stimuli and attention, not emotionally but as “faulty cognition.” Though not
emotional, this is still a sociomental process: Cohen notes that these “attentional tricks” of
content that one does or does not take in are shared through cultures and families.9
Sykes and Matza highlight how what one focuses on is informed through one’s social
group. In their case, they focus on “juvenile delinquent” subcultures. These subcultures help
group members “neutralize” the impact of their actions through specific, socially shared
techniques. The researchers found four main techniques. The first three are similar: denial of
responsibility; denial of injury; and denial of a victim. Here, groups put more attention on certain
aspects of a situation than others. The fourth technique, the condemnation of condemners, is also
about attention. Sykes and Matza state, “The delinquent shifts the focus of attention from his
own deviant acts to the motives and behavior of those who disapprove of his violations.”10 The
final technique of neutralization, an appeal to higher loyalties, like the previous techniques, is
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also about socially conditioned placement of attention. In this final technique, more attention is
paid to subculture values than mainstream social values. The youth discussed in this classic study
all participate in sociomental processes of denial through shared culture, which is developed
through sociological processes.
Though in a much different way, Mary Douglas also illustrates the cultural specificity of
classification through examining dirt cross-culturally. Douglas writes, “Dirt offends against
order. Eliminating it is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organise the
environment.”11 Douglas understands that classifications happen in all cultures, but that some
cultures do not afford other cultures’ classification systems with the same respect. In looking at
Western approaches to the home, for instance, Douglas points out that the typical rituals of a
Western woman are shaped through classifications that are not so different from those of any
other culture:
When we honestly reflect on our busy scrubbings and cleanings in this light we know that
we are not mainly trying to avoid disease. We are separating, placing boundaries, making
visible statements about the home that we are intending to create out of the material
house. If we keep the bathroom cleaning materials away from the kitchen cleaning
materials and send the men to the downstairs lavatory and the women upstairs, we are
essentially doing the same thing as the Bushman wife when she arrives at a new camp.12
By taking such a mundane example as dirt as her object, Douglas explores the sometimes
invisible classification systems in all cultures. Dirt, she says, “is the by-product of a systematic
ordering and classification of matter.”13 This by-product can be understood sometimes without
reference to the original classification: in other words, we know dirt without having to think of
clean.
Classification is all about inclusion and exclusion; “naming splits the world into two,” as
Zygmunt Bauman has said.14 This system of naming is a necessary precondition to a sociomental
manifestation of denial where the “other” is denied. And “invariably, such operation of
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inclusion/exclusion is an act of violence perpetrated upon the world, and requires the support of a
certain amount of coercion. It can hold as long as the volume of applied coercion remains
adequate to the task of outbalancing the extent of created discrepancy.”15 In a sense, Bauman
explicitly and necessarily politicizes what the other theorists do not—that every act of
differential attention is made political by that sociomental process of splitting what one does and
does not pay attention to.
For Bauman, ambivalence is “the possibility of assigning an object or an event to more
than one category” and is “a language-specific disorder: a failure of the naming (segregating)
function that language is meant to perform. The main symptom of disorder is the acute
discomfort felt when one is unable to read the situation properly and to choose between
alternative actions.”16 Ambivalence, through language and structure, lies at the center of the
negotiation between order and chaos. “Through its naming/classifying function, language posits
itself between a solidly founded, orderly world fit for human habitation, and a contingent world
of randomness, in which human survival weapons—memory, the capacity for learning—would
be useless, if not downright suicidal. Language strives to sustain the order and to deny or
suppress randomness and contingency.”17 Thus in Bauman’s conceptualization, denial of
contingency—the unknown, the inexpressible—is the foundation of the very structure of
knowing and of language.
Arguing that all cultures make impositions on reality, Edward Said, like Bauman,
politicizes some of the same concepts and patterns that Goffman and Zerubavel make clear. Said
is particularly interested in the process through which the West has come to understand the
Orient.18 Focusing on a specific cultural and historical cognitive split, Said’s theory of
Orientalism—the way in which the West has come to understand the East through what he terms
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the “Orientalist stage”—is a system of moral and epistemological rigor, a system of social
classification that “is taught, it has its own societies, periodicals, traditions, vocabulary, rhetoric,
all in basic ways connected to and supplied by the prevailing cultural and political norms of the
West.”19 Said goes a step beyond Zerubavel and Goffman to suggest that the ways in which
cognitive splits are produced are not just social, in the neutral sense of the term, but also political
and in some cases nationalistic and oppressive. Reading Durkheim through Said’s perspective
casts light on how political sociomental processes are: “We do not understand except in thinking
through concepts. But sensory reality is not cut out to enter spontaneously and by itself the
framework of our concepts. It resists this, and to make it pliant with it, we must force it to some
extent, submit it to all sorts of laborious operations that alter it to make it assimilable by the
mind, and we never manage to triumph completely over its resistance.”20 I turn now to seeing
this struggle in the five cases.
EPISTEMIC VIOLATIONS
I have identified three common patterns of epistemic violations of moral rights to spatial
and bodily autonomy that social movements claim. These violations occur through ideas about
dominion, identity construction through the erasure of the other, and ruptures in commonality
through dehumanization.
Dominion
Cultural conceptions of dominion have shaped many of the conditions that contested
social movements struggle against. Colonialism is a prime example. In the 1840s and 1850s
white settlers of the original thirteen colonies called themselves native Americans. These nativist
parties had no sense of irony when pushing to keep more not-yet-white immigrants out of the
United States, as well as Chinese and Japanese immigrants. There was particular concern about
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Irish and German Catholics from a group of “native Americans” that became known as the
Know-Nothing Party, garnering their name from how they responded to participation in their
secret society—they knew nothing about what the questioner was talking about. Though the
parties of the 1800s dissolved, their spirit continued in groups like the Ku Klux Klan and in
many ways the dominant anti-immigrant discourse of the late 2010s Republican party. Even
views that are more liberal still embrace the idea that settlers have dominion over the land—this
is seen in the ironic way the Canadian government grants recognition to First Nations people.
Canada’s dominion over the land gives the nation its ability to make that recognition, as it
paradoxically acknowledges the original owners of the land.21 In this way sociospatial issues are
pushed to sociomental ones, from issues of land to issues of culture.22
This is also true in Israel and Palestine, where some are seen to have dominion over land
and others are not. Max Weber’s essay Politics as a Vocation articulates the state as that which
has the legitimate use of violence within a given territory.23 Legitimacy is, in part, granted
through ideas of who has dominion over the territory. Conceptions of Israeli dominion over
territory render illegitmate any resistance on the part of the Palestinians and allow them to be
continually marked as terrorists. Thus, dominion leads to identity construction.
Cultural Identity
How is it that a group of settlers, as in the case of the United States, can become so
oblivious to the circumstances that produced the conditions of their society? American
nationalist identity is formed through erasure—denial of the actual circumstances of the nation’s
founding. At the same time these parties developed in the United States, specifically from 1820
to 1844, 100,000 American Indians were removed from their homes and transported west of the
Mississippi, up to a third of them dying or being killed during this process. Native peoples in the
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Americas were not eliminated without effort or massive discussion and public policy. Native
elimination was a much-discussed issue of which people had awareness—even as historians
continue to ignore its significance.24 Yet settlers were able to also not-know about this when they
positioned themselves as the natives. Andrea Smith calls out this denial when she argues, “By
instituting repressive immigration policies, the U.S. government is once again asserting that it—
and not indigenous nations—should determine who can be on these lands.”25
Sociomental processes of belonging and national identity facilitate Americans’ ability to
disavow the country’s history. As stated before, categorization itself is a political project of
inclusion and exclusion. The same process of categorization that embodies the paradox of denial
is seen in the discourse around Thanksgiving. In 1863, following the violence of the Civil War,
Lincoln declared Thanksgiving a national holiday. From its origins, Thanksgiving was a myth
meant to unite a divided country.26 It was never based in the reality it supposedly celebrates.
Thanksgiving as a holiday is exemplary of American denial of Native American genocide and
elimination; it expresses the awareness of the history at the same time as it manifests disavowal.
The United States collectively participates in an annual celebration of denial. The truth of the
“first Thankgiving” is not a story of friendship. The Wampanoag people did engage in a
relationship with the pilgrims and helped them to survive the harsh northeastern winter, but when
the Wampanoag contracted diseases from the English settlers, the pilgrims saw an opportunity to
conquer them. A war began that the pilgrims won. Wampanoags who weren’t killed were sent as
slaves to the West Indies. The pilgrims gave thanks in a day of celebration where they played
games with the decapitated heads of the indigenous people.27 A people can only do this to
another people when they have set up sociomental categories of cultural identity, through
exclusion, to produce a great deal of denial.
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State- and nation-making are sociological processes built on and necessitating
categorization. This is inextricable from racial categorization, as Gilmore has defined it:
“Racism, specifically, is the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of groupdifferentiated vulnerability to premature death.”28 Gilmore further argues that “racism is the
ordinary means through which dehumanization achieves ideological normality” though it
concomitantly produces that very racism.29 She argues that as old races die though extermination
or assimilation, new races emerge. This is a biopoltical, not biological, phenomenon, and this
means that the state depends on classification plus militarism to maintain any kind of national
coherence. Moreover, this is done through physical and ideological force. As Gilmore writes,
“the racializations of Muslims in the current era does double duty in both establishing an enemy
whose being can be projected through the allegation of unshakable heritage (fundamentally, what
the fiction of race is at best) and renewing the racial order of the US polity as normal, even as it
changes.”30 This is clearly seen in the Republican rhetoric of the 2016 election season, as this
discourse has only proliferated since September 11th, 2001.
This is important to recognize not only when talking about the United States as a settler
colonial state but as an imperial force that funds the Israeli apartheid state. Mumia Abu-Jamal
explains this well when he says, “The US doesn’t hate Palestine. The truth is something far
worse, for dismissal is more damning than hatred. Palestine, its people, its history, its culture, its
art, its poetry, its very land, is dismissed as a mere trifle by the US Empire, not dissimilar to the
response of the old British Empire, which dispatched the lands, hopes and dreams of the
Palestinians, with cold, imperial aplomb.”31 People dismiss the plight of Palestinians while
refusing to acknowledge that Palestinian humanity is being denied.
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Dayan highlights that what are especially masked in the debates are the “unique and
various forms of violence used to control the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the eruption of the
Second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000.”32 This masking can be uncovered in many
examples. Corey Robin notes, regarding the Washington Post headline “13 Israeli soldiers, 70
others killed,” that Palestinians are literally “othered.”33 Thus Dayan’s becomes able to answer
his own question: “Dispossessed of their homes and ancestral lands and labeled as outsiders and
enemies, Palestinians are confined as nothing more than superfluity.”34
The construction of cultural identity through othering extends beyond settler colonialism
in the United States to mass incarceration as well. Michelle Alexander poses the question: “Is it
possible that the roundup, lockdown, and exclusion of black men en masse from the body politic
has occurred largely unnoticed? The answer is yes and no.”35 Alexander makes the process of
categorizing who is disposable clear with this comparison: “The vastly different sentences
afforded drunk drivers and drug offenders speaks volumes to regarding who is viewed as
disposable—someone to be purged from the body politic—and who is not.”36
Alexander makes clear that what is denied about prison is race—that racism is
structural.37 “The critical point here is that for black men, the stigma of being a ‘criminal’ in the
era of mass incarceration is fundamentally a racial stigma.”38 In perhaps her most profound
point, she argues that in colorblind US society, one cannot express open hatred of blacks, but one
can, and perhaps in dominant discourse, should, hate criminals.39 Through this racial caste
system the social construction of the criminalblackman emerges: “The criminal label is essential,
for forms of explicit racial exclusion are not only prohibited but widely condemned. Thus, black
youth must be made—labeled—criminals.”40 Once this is done, black people are excluded from
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nationalist constructions of identity. This is important especially now that “alt-right” white
supremacy is emerging as a particular kind of nationalism in the Trump era.
The importance of the label and the sociomental development of these categories is why
Wacquant posits that more than a Marxist lens is needed for talking about incarceration (and, I
would argue, for society generally)—Durkheim is needed to elucidate symbolic racism. He
explains, “The prison symbolizes material divisions and materializes relations of symbolic
power.”41 Wacquant very explicitly connects labels of worth and the unworthy poor to
criminality.42 He explains that inmates have a triple stigma: moral, class, and caste. In the racial
criminalization of poverty, blacks are labeled criminal (moral stigma), poor (class stigma), and
black (caste stigma in an antiblack society).43
Dehumanization
Dehumanization follows from such forms of cultural identity construction. This is how
unarmed 18-year-old female students, like Hadil Hashlamoun, are gunned down at checkpoints
for requesting to be frisked by a female soldier. Hashlamoun died of the ten gunshot wounds
after being left for thirty minutes bleeding on the ground before the Israel Defense Forces
allowed doctors to approach her. In this kind of production of the enemy, Bauman is all too
correct when he says, “Defence of one’s own right to live needs a denial of such right to the
Other.”44 And this allows Palestinian children to be killed without regard. Dayan argues,
“Palestinians are labeled as ‘terrorists’ by the powerful, so that lethal force is the rule and
extreme violence—or exemplary disregard—may be directed indiscriminately against civilians
and non-civilians alike.”45 Cultural identity can extend beyond nation to humanity—those not
included in the same identity are no longer human.
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Gilmore offers a rigorous economic analysis of prison expansion to show that crime has
very little to do with the dramatic increases in mass incarceration and the development of
twenty-three new prisons in California since 1984. Gilmore’s work helps illuminate how in
capitalism the work of the state is to produce and perpetuate racism though geographic means—a
theory of racial capitalism. But this is not only a geographic project but one that concerns
identity construction. Gilmore states, “The media, government officials and policy advisers
endlessly refer to the moral panic over crime and connect prison growth to public desire for
social order.” This is not as much about the state’s definition of crime as it is about deviance and
is therefore “a moral [but] not (necessarily) legal panic.”46 It is a distinction, Gilmore suggests,
which allows public anxiety about social deviance to overshadow more immediate issues like
recessions, inflation, and unemployment. A moral panic functionally forecloses an
acknowledgment of material conditions. Denial, then, is a central condition for the development
of a post-Keynesian state that relies on mass incarceration to facilitate the illusion of a moral
society that is anything but and helps to perpetuate the racist capitalist state.
The dehumanization of black people can, unfortunately, be seen in countless examples.
Here, I will focus on how dehumanization through the construction of black criminality
manifests in the school-to-prison pipeline. Of course, this pipeline can be analyzed in various
ways—I am thinking particularly how racial capitalism relies on a large prison population and an
underclass—but here I focus on the criminalization of children of color and police in school.
This is exemplified in what happened to Madisyn Moore, a six-year-old girl who took a piece of
candy off of her teacher’s desk. The security guard handcuffed the child under a stairwell until
her mother was able to come and get her crying child uncuffed.47 Situations in which black
children are constituted as criminals from a young age are not uncommon, and the system is
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designed to perpetuate the production of black youth as criminals in the fact that security guards
are there to police the children, not protect them. Educators are also being trained to interrogate
students with techniques that are even questionable to use on adults in jails—even as students do
not have the same rights as those who have been formally arrested. The training teaches them not
to stop when they see tears because “tears are the beginning of a confession” and to make sure to
take their phones “so they can’t call their mothers.”48 That makes this statistic all the more
upsetting: School security officers outnumber counselors in four out of the ten largest public
school districts in the country including three of the nation’s five biggest school districts, which
are New York City, Chicago, and Miami-Dade.49 Situations that used to be handled in schools by
school staff, like fights between students, are now criminalized, and students can face arrest. Of
course, students who have already been criminalized through sociomental processes of
racialization are more likely to suffer from these laws as their acts, even as small as taking a
piece of candy, are seen as criminal. This racist process is a tragic manifestation of sociomental
categories that allow the public to deny children’s youth and criminalize and dehumanize people
by skin color.
In no way do I wish to compare the experiences of oppressed people to those of
nonhuman animals, but I do compare the tactics of the oppressor in its methods of domination
and violation, and this is also in the case of farmed animals. Of course, it might seem strange to
talk about the nonhuman in a section on dehumanization, but what Adams has identified as the
absent referent is relevant beyond her application to animals. Very few see the animals that they
eat before the animals’ bodies have been turned into pieces of meat. But with the exception of
young children,50 most know they are eating animals. Still, people find ways to distance
themselves from that knowledge. Carol J. Adams points out how this takes place: “Dismembered
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bodies are called ‘whole,’ creating the contradiction of purchasing a ‘whole bird’ whose feathers,
feet and head are missing. Can a dead bird really be a ‘fresh young chicken’ as the plastic
wrapping at the meat counter proclaims?”51 We recreate the ontology of chicken-as-meat as raw
chicken, rather than formerly living beings.52 This is what Carol J. Adams calls the “absent
referent.” As a form of denial, the absent referent is a paradox; something could only be a
referent if it is in some way present.53 It becomes absent because it is denied: in Simmel’s terms,
the animals are the stranger in society, always absent and yet also present.
The absent referent happens in three ways: literally, through definition, and
metaphorically. Carol J. Adams conceptualizes the absent referent in developing a feministvegetarian critical theory. In thinking about animals used for food, the absent referent can be
seen in all three ways. Animals are literally killed so their presence is literally absent from
consumers’ lives—most consumers never meet the animals they eat. As she writes, “without
animals there would be no meat eating, yet they are absent from the act of eating meat because
they have been transformed into food.” Food definitions make animals absent; “pork” absents the
“pig”. Adams continues, “Our culture further mystifies the term ‘meat’ with gastronomic
language, so we do not conjure dead, butchered animals, but cuisine.” And, third, the absent
referent is evoked metaphorically when people say things like “I feel like a piece of meat”: they
don’t acknowledge what it is like to be a piece of meat—and that meat is by definition dead and
devoid of feelings. “The absent referent permits us to forget about the animal as an independent
entity; it also enables us to resist efforts to make animals present.”54
Even Stanley Cohen, who wrote the book on denial, cannot confront the absent referent
of animals as meat:
I am particularly oblivious—in total denial—about animal issues. I know that the
treatment of animals in cruel experiments and factory farming is difficult to defend. I can
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even see the case for becoming a vegetarian. But in the end, much like people throwing
away an Amnesty leaflet, my filters go into automatic drive: this is not my responsibility;
there are worse problems; there are plenty of other people looking after this. What do you
mean, I’m in denial every time I eat a hamburger?55
Here Cohen very helpfully exemplifies the paradox of denial: like most omnivores, he is not at
all intellectually unaware of the problems with meat eating and yet he is still able to put it out of
mind.
Timothy Pachirat, in his ethnography of industrialized slaughter, begins with the story of
six cows that escaped an industrialized slaughterhouse in Nebraska in 2004. One cow separated
from the others and was cornered in an alley of another nearby slaughterhouse. Surrounded by
workers from the first slaughterhouse and Omaha police officers armed with shotguns, the cow
was not easily corralled and was shot dead by the police officers. This occurred during a tenminute break for workers at the second slaughterhouse who were greatly disturbed and horrified
by the shooting, comparing it to a recent shooting of an unarmed Mexican man by the Omaha
Police. Pachirat’s story is compelling because one expects that slaughterhouse workers would be
anesthetized to such things—in the United States, after all, a cow is killed every twelve seconds,
which is the name of Pachirat’s book—and yet they were shocked and sickened by the shooting
of one cow.
Sociomental processes also facilitate denial of humanity’s ties to nature. Even the phrase
“ties to nature” elides humans as an inextricable part of nature. The entire discourse of nature
versus nurture, and even the idea that sociology and biology are disciplines removed from each
other, plays into the distancing of human culture from nature. It is a sociomental process that
people engage in when designating something as “nature,” and this involves power and denial.
This problem also arises when “natural disasters” occur. Neil Smith makes the argument,
as do many environmental geographers, that what makes a natural event a disaster is not the
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natural event itself but the social relations of the locations. Smith focuses specifically on
Hurricane Katrina when he says that the divorce of social conditions from natural events
facilitates circumstances like the Bush administration’s ability to blame over one thousand
people’s deaths on an act of nature. What Smith calls “ideological camouflage”—this process of
categorizing a disaster as “natural”—I would call a sociomental production of denial. Because,
as Smith surmises, “disasters don’t simply flatten landscapes, washing them smooth. Rather they
deepen and erode the ruts of social difference they encounter,” but categorizing them as “natural
disaster” masks this truth.56
CONCLUSION
Charles Mills asks readers to imagine what he calls white ignorance: “Imagine an
ignorance that resists. Imagine an ignorance that fights back. Imagine an ignorance militant,
aggressive, not to be intimidated, an ignorance that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go
quietly—not at all confined to the illiterate and uneducated but propagated at the highest levels
of the land, indeed presenting itself unblushingly as knowledge.”57 Denial is not something that
can be remedied by knowledge and awareness because that is the very thing that causes the
denial. That is, without awareness, there could be nothing to deny. Denial complicates any linear
move between knowledge and action. Awareness is necessary but insufficient. Since denial is a
paradox, one paradoxically denies what one knows and, in some contexts, talks about all the time
and in other cases even ingests. Despite the fact that both Cohen and Zerubavel focus their
attention on horrible things, it is not just horrible things that become the objects of denial; denial
is an everyday practice that applies on every level, from lunch to favorite holidays.
Because denial is a paradox, there is no easy way to spot it; denial hides itself in
inattention; that is its very character. Hannah Arendt’s understanding of self-deception is helpful

-80-

here because it too is a paradox—how can one deceive oneself? “Self-deception still presupposes a distinction between truth and falsehood, between fact and fantasy,” she writes,
“which disappears in an entirely defactualized mind. . . . Self-deception is the danger par
excellence; the self-deceived deceiver loses all contact, not only with his audience but with the
real world which will catch up with him, as he can remove only his mind from it and not his
body.”58
This chapter has explained how sociomental processes are a key aspect of understanding
denial. But is it as simple as just splitting the world into categories? Bauman argues,
Drawing clear dividing lines between normal and abnormal, orderly and chaotic, sane and
sick, reasonable and mad, are all accomplishments of power. To draw such lines is to
dominate; it is the domination which wears the masks of norm or health, which appears
now as reason, now as sanity, now as law and order. . . . Power turns out its enemies by
denying them what it strives to secure for itself; and the enemy exists only of and through
that denial. . . . When (if) it succeeds, the inseparable will have been separated, the
indivisible divided, existence will no longer seem fragile nor the world mysterious.59
To go deeper into understanding this sociomental classification, Bauman turns to psychoanalysis,
as I will do in the next chapter. As he explains,
Psychoanalysis was to be an art of interpretation. It transformed the human world, the
whole of it . . . into a text to be interpreted; it refused to accept the pinned-on labels as
meanings, the filing-cabinet code-names as identities. . . . By asking questions, it sapped
the structure whose substance was the prohibition of asking. It was the very essence of
psychoanalytical challenge that no code of interpretation is privileged, no one meaninggiving context is obviously superior to others, no one meaning is to be chosen to the
exclusion of others. Things are not what we are told they are or forced to believe they
should be.60
In this spirit, I move from examining that sociomental processes facilitate denial, to why—a
query that moves this dissertation to the unconscious.
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Chapter Five
More in Mind Than We Know: The Unconscious and Denial
The main idea behind this study of aggression is that if society is in danger, it is not
because of man’s aggressiveness but because of the repression of personal
aggressiveness in individuals.
—Winnicott “Aggression in Relation to Emotional Development”1

Thus far I have talked about upsetting and tragic circumstances and patterns of social
behavior but without explicitly posing the question, Why are we doing this? I have been focusing
on how social actors engage in denial, or that they do so. In the sociospatial chapter I argued that
denial is laid out spatially, then that denial is structured in cognitive sociomental processing.
Here I move through the psychosocial scale and engage with the unconscious to uncover
aggression in denial, which is then highlighted through unconscious motivations for contested
social problems, particularly constructions of the self, ideas of good and bad, and disavowal. The
psychosocial paradigm demonstrates that denial is not simply about avoiding displeasure but
about active engagement in expressions of aggression.
THE UNCONSCIOUS AND DENIAL
The unconscious is not just in the individual psyche. Many have argued that there is a
social unconscious—the concept appears in the work of all the classical theorists, though not
necessarily explicitly acknowledged. Implicit in any idea of social norms and patterns is an
unconscious. Social patterns of thinking, shared categories, and shared meanings emerge but are
not always explicitly identified. There must be an unconscious that does this. Fanon argues that
this collective unconscious is a consequence of an “impulsive cultural imposition.”2 Cultural
neuroses embodied by individuals are produced not by the individual but by the environment.3
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Psychoanalysts have also talked about this phenomenon to account for what they see in their
patients. Layton calls these normative unconscious processes. “Normative unconscious processes
refer to that aspect of the unconscious that pulls to repeat affect/behavior/cognition patterns that
uphold the very social norms that cause psychic distress in the first place.”4
What would it mean for sociology to acknowledge this largely unspoken unconscious?
Perhaps then scholars could take seriously Lynn Chancer’s question, What “if patterned social
defense mechanisms could be identified, though they might require concepts that both use and
point beyond Freudian notions culled from empirical observations of individuals (not groups)?”5
Could it be that “an underlying connection between sociology and psychoanalysis is one of
hyper- rather than irrelevance. If so, then exploring rather than denying the unconscious as a star
Freudian tenet matters, the psychodynamic becomes the sociological and vice versa.”6 Chancer is
right to ask this question, as the unspoken hyperrelevance of the unconscious appears in various
literatures.
Durkheim makes clear the relevance of the unconscious when he talks about coercive
sociality. Joshua Howard, in his reading of Durkheim, suggests that what Durkheim is really
talking about when he refers to the coercive aspects of culture are unconscious cultural
processes. One does not consciously identify a dollar bill on the street as money, as different
from a piece of litter on the sidewalk; these distinctions are made unconsciously.7 Yet some
social theorists, such as Zerubavel, do not see the unconscious as part of the purview of
sociology. Part of this is because it is hard, or impossible, to empirically verify the unconscious.
Yet psychoanalysts have tools for engaging with the unconscious and revealing its
manifestations. What would it mean for sociology to explore the unconscious with some of these

-86-

tools? Regardless of whether or not sociologists acknowledge it—whether we remain in denial or
not—the unconscious is part of culture.
Guattari’s view posits the unconscious as very much part of culture—it is “something
that we drag around with ourselves both in our gestures and daily objects, as well as on TV, that
is part of the zeitgeist, and even, and perhaps especially, in our day-to-day problems. . . . Thus,
the unconscious works inside individuals in their manner of perceiving the world and living their
body, territory, and sex, as well as inside the couple, the family, school, neighborhood, factories,
stadiums, and universities.”8 An understanding of the unconscious such as this suggests
consideration of Bourdieu’s habitus or Althusser’s ideology as a theory of the unconscious.
Jacques Lacan’s articulation of the unconscious is helpful in furthering this analysis: he
argues the unconscious is the unknown known. He claims that “[psycho]analysis appears on the
scene to announce that there is knowledge which does not know itself.”9 Sociologists have been
saying this, as well, just not explicitly. Articulating the unconscious as such is incredibly helpful
in furthering the work of the theorists mentioned in the previous sections. Lacan offers space to
consider what sociologists have taken in to ourselves, but not consciously.
So what does this mean for denial? For one, the unconscious complicates understandings
of agency. Members of a society do not consciously choose their social structures. Their dynamic
engagement as individuals with the social structure may largely be happening in the unconscious
modulation between the two, rather than in, say, policy decisions. The unconscious also allows
exploration of what happens when something is put out of sight and out of mind, as discussed in
the previous two chapters. The psychosocial approach, which explores the unconscious socially,
allows scholars to look for what has been materially and cognitively swept under the rug. A
psychosocial approach makes the residue of these cultural patterns visible and draws out some
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consequences that remain unseen in the other paradigms. Psychoanalysis reconciles the
contradiction or paradox of denial much more than the other paradigms—that with denial one
both knows and doesn’t know. The other paradigms demonstrate that this happens but not how it
happens.
For Freud, there are many ways to not-know. Repression is sometimes understood as not
knowing one’s own instinctual denial, whereas disavowal is sometimes considered to be the notknowing of external stimuli when both or either are too difficult to bear. These distinctions often
blur along with the connection between internal and external environment. Any denial is an
energy-intensive action.10 Stanley Cohen uses a psychoanalytic concept to establish his definition
of denial. Drawing on Bollas and encompassing both repression and disavowal, Cohen’s formula
for denial is “the need to be innocent of a troubling recognition,” something “too threatening to
confront, but impossible to ignore.”11 Theorists like Cohen have argued that people ignore
inconvenient truths,12 much like the title of the famous documentary about climate change—
denial can be very convenient. Anna Freud, in her elaboration on defense mechanisms, furthers
the discussion of denial in a way I find useful for understanding denial. Conflicts engaged in by
the ego, whether it be with the id, the superego, or the external world, all manifest with defensive
mechanisms to save the ego from experiencing unpleasure.13
I think denial, however, is much more complex than providing convenience or avoiding
unpleasure. I thus diverge from Sigmund Freud slightly, as well as from Anna Freud’s
elaboration on defense mechanisms. In this chapter I propose that the social pattern of denial is
not about ignoring but about a complex unconscious mix of desire and aggression. I draw here
on Klein and Winnicott to rethink denial and make the concept more applicable to the workings
of the social unconscious.
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Melanie Klein’s paranoid schizoid position is a state of being, originating in childhood
but often left unresolved, where a subject without the means to adequately protect the ego
experiences the world being rigorously split between good and bad so that they may be able to
project all the bad and only introject the positive. Upon the subject’s reaching maturity the bad
would ideally be integrated into the ego, as well, yet when the individual is still in the paranoid
schizoid position, a persecutory and then reciprocally paranoid stance is developed around the
object on which the “bad” was projected.14 Klein presents the unconscious as divided, so that
people may not even be consciously aware of the divisions or classifications they are constantly
making—certainly this is true, as shown in the previous chapter, in people’s inability to think
outside culturally produced categories. But I find Klein’s analysis of the bad most useful for the
study of denial. Here I move beyond the sociospatial and sociomental chapters to consider why
denial happens.
For Klein, the depressive position is melancholia in its nascent state—the baby is
weaned, and greedy and destructive fantasies emerge; “[love, goodness, security] are felt by the
baby to be lost, and lost as a result of his own uncontrollable greedy and destructive phantasies
and impulses against his mother’s breasts.”15 Adam Phillips links and bridges Klein and
Winnicott’s theories—he argues for the necessity of seeing Klein in Winnicott’s work.16 Klein’s
depressive position corresponds to Winnicott’s stage of concern—this is when the capacity for
guilt emerges—the guilt and concern wrapped up in the infant’s desire for the mother. Moving
from the breast of Klein to Winnicott’s mother, the baby now struggles with reconciling the
mother she eats with the mother who cares for her. The baby feels guilt for wanting to devour the
mother she loves and concern about what her desire might to do the mother.17 In comparison, in
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the earlier paranoid schizoid position, the baby cannot feel guilt because the mother has not yet
been integrated—she remains two part-objects.18
In the earliest stage of the baby’s development, it is not just the mother that is split—the
ego develops a split, as well, through processes of introjection and projection.
Experiences of a painful nature, frustrations from internal and external sources, which are
felt as persecution, are primarily attributed to the external and internal persecuting
objects. In all such experiences, persecutory anxiety and aggression reinforce each other.
For while the infant’s aggressive impulse through projection play a fundamental part in
his building up of persecutory figures, these very figures increase his persecutory anxiety
and in turn reinforce his aggressive impulses and phantasies against the external and
internal objects felt to be dangerous.19
Aggression plays a huge part in the development of the ego—it is both introjected and projected.
Winnicott posits the aggressive impulse as even more important than erotic impulses.
This is a huge move away from Freud and what I find most useful for this discussion.
Understandings of denial shift when examined through aggressive impulses rather than solely
erotic and pleasure impulses; it can no longer be understood as simply a mechanism of protecting
the ego from pain or displeasure. Aggression precedes ego development, as Winnicott argues,
and thus is part of the psychic structure from its very formation.20 “Aggression is part of the
primitive expression of love,” Winnicott explains; this is seen even as the fetus kicks in the
womb.21 Because there is no such thing as complete id satisfaction, reactive aggression can be
detected from the moment of the primitive love impulse.22 But erotic life can develop without
integration with the aggressive reactive life. The erotic life doesn’t feel as real, however, and the
person lives primarily within their aggressive life, which is dependent on opposition. Because the
sense of self isn’t integrated or fused, and and the erotic life doesn’t feel real, the self becomes
organized around aggression and then later persecution.23
The immediate conclusion to be drawn from this observation is that in the early stages,
when the Me and the Not-Me are being established, it is the aggressive component that
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more surely drives the individual to a need for a Not-Me or an object that is felt to be
external. The erotic experiences can be completed while the object is subjectively
conceived or personally created, or while the individual is near to the narcissistic state of
primary identification of earlier date. The erotic experiences can be completed by
anything that brings relief to the erotic instinctual drive, and that allows of forepleasure,
rising tension of general and local excitement, climax and detumescence or its equivalent,
followed by a period of lack of desire. . . . On the other hand, the aggressive impulses do
not give any satisfactory experience unless there is opposition. The opposition must come
from the environment, from the Not-Me which gradually comes to be distinguished from
the Me.24
How might satisfaction of the aggressive impulse be conceived in relation to denial?
For Klein, it is not a coincidence that the split structure of ego development for children
is the same for individuals mourning. “My contention is that the child goes through states of
mind comparable to the mourning of the adult, or rather, that this early mourning is revived
whenever grief is experienced in later life.”25 Thus melancholia can be thought of in terms of
aggression. For Freud, melancholia, in contrast to mourning, is when the object-loss is
withdrawn from consciousness and the loss is internalized: “In mourning it is the world which
has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself.”26 The ego tries to incorporate the
object by devouring it.27 The problem is that though the object is gone, the love is not, so the
love seeks refuge in identification with the object, but so too do the other feelings for the object.
The hate operates in abusing and debasing the substitute object, which is the ego itself. The
paradoxically enjoyable self-tormenting of melancholia is of particular interest here. “The
melancholic’s erotic cathexis in regard to his object has thus undergone a double vicissitude: part
of it has regressed to identification, but the other part, under the influence of the conflict due to
ambivalence, has been carried back to the stage of sadism, which is nearer to that conflict.”28
Unfortunately, there is no winning in melancholia. When the lost object is gone, it is gone, and
there are severe consequences to denial of loss through melancholia.

-91-

Butler follows Klein in discussing melancholia in this way; introjection of the lost object
can lead to dangerous consequences. “The result is that for the ego to live, it must let the other
die, but that proves difficult when ‘letting die’ feels too close to ‘murder’ or, indeed, to taking
impossible responsibility for the other’s death. Better to take one’s own life than become a
murderer, even if taking one’s life confirms oneself as a murderer of the self.”29 Thinking of
denial this way, denial without aggression is not possible. This is why, Cheng says, “the
melancholic’s relationship to the object is now no longer just love of nostalgia but also profound
resentment. The melancholic is not melancholic because he or she has lost something but
because he or she has introjected that which he or she now reviles. Thus the melancholic is stuck
in more ways than just temporally; he or she is stuck—almost choking on—the hateful and loved
thing he or she just devoured.”30
Neither the sociospatial or sociomental paradigms account for aggression, but the
examples in the last two chapters indicate that aggression is a major part of denial. All of the
exclusions discussed—prisons, elimination of entire populations of people, eating animals—all
play in to what Cheng describes here:
At this moment loss becomes exclusion in the melancholic landscape. What Freud does
not address . . . but what must be a consequence of this psychical drama is the multiple
layers of denial and exclusion that the melancholic must exercise in order to maintain this
elaborate structure of loss-but-not-loss. First, the melancholic must deny loss as loss in
order to sustain the fiction of possession. Second, the melancholic would have to make
sure that the ‘object’ never returns, for such a return would surely jeopardize the
cannibalistic project that, one might note, is a form of possession more intimate than any
material relation could produce. Thus although it may seem reasonable to imagine that
the griever may wish for the return of the loved one, once this digestive process has
occurred, the ego may in fact not want or cannot afford such homecoming.31
I begin now to look at examples with this psychosocial insight.
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UNCONSCIOUS AGGRESSIONS
Unconscious aggression that produces conditions of violation happens through three
mechanisms that I have identified: constructions of the self, tensions between good and bad, and
disavowal. I explore these, primarily focusing on settler colonialism, Israeli apartheid, mass
incarceration, industrialized animal slaughter, and environmental destruction.
Construction of the Self
Aggression is a central psychoanalytic concept necessary to an understanding of what is
not addressed in the sociomental framework for identity construction. This is clear in an analysis
of settler colonialism in the United States, particularly in the 1800s. Michael Rogin analyzes the
psychosocial aspects of the Jacksonian-era elimination of Native Americans alongside US
liberalism, understood as the “unchallenged primacy of propertied individualism across the
political spectrum.”32 Liberalism insisted that white men conquer and separate themselves from
nature, in contrast to the American Indians, who were seen as in harmony with nature. Because
property was key to liberalism, the communal understanding of land held by American Indians
was seen as primitive.
The consequence was forbidden nostalgia, for the nurturing, blissful, and primitively
violent connection to nature that white Americans had to leave behind. At the core of
liberalism lay the belief that such human connections to each other and to the land were
dreams only, subjects of nostalgia or sentimentalization but impossible in the existing
adult world. By suggesting the reality of the dream, Indian societies posted a severe threat
to liberal identity. The only safe Indians were dead, sanitized, or totally dependent on
white benevolence.33
Rogin explains that whites understood evolution of societies to follow the same logic of
an individual—the American Indians were still children to the white parents. This was the actual
discourse, not his post-hoc analysis—the whites actually spoke in terms of familial relations in
speeches and published writings. It is no surprise whites are found to have projected this idea
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onto American Indians when analyzed through a psychosocial perspective. And it clarifies how
the whites could commit genocide against the people for whom they were supposed to hold
paternal care. Rogin explains that
the symbols of Indian policy expressed repressed anxiety at the premature separation
from warm, maternal protection. In the white fantasy, Indians remain in the oral stage,
sustained by and unseparated from mother nature. They are at once symbols of a lost
childhood bliss and, as bad children, repositories of murderous negative projections.
Adult independence wreaks vengeance upon its own nostalgia for infant dependence. The
Indian’s tie with nature must be broken, literally by uprooting him, figuratively by
civilizing him, finally by killing him.34
The melancholic liberal white settler cannot confront his own loss, and to preserve the
introjected object he clings to, he must murder the American Indian to avoid facing the reality of
his loss. The melancholic devours but can never be satisfied. Rogin argues that whites regressed
and sought to regain the lost attachment by “expanding, swallowing, and incorporating” the
land.35
Rogin points out the white settlers were in denial—how could they settle the land under
the assertion that men have the power to control their fate, and then destroy another group of
people?36 The whites projected their own feelings and actions onto the American Indians.
President Andrew Jackson complained that “an Indian will claim everything and anything” after
coercing a treaty that granted him ten million acres of Cherokee land.37 American Indians were
accused of killing babies and devouring flesh, when in reality it was a practice of whites to kill
American Indian babies.38 This rewriting of “history rescued a man from melancholy; he could
tread on Indian graves in peace.”39
This same melancholic construction of the self occurs with meat, as well. If melancholy
is ingestion of the lost object, what might that mean for what one actually ingests? Chen says that
“‘the animal’ stands in to melancholically symbolize what is being lost as a consequence
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(‘natural’ or not) of human dominance over the earth it occupies.”40 This is of course symbolic,
as Chen states, but when one eats the animal, be it a cow, pig, or chicken, one literally ingests
one’s melancholy. In a Winnicottian perspective, aggressive impulses are satisfied in opposition
to the “Not-Me”; thus, meat eating is a complicated dance, an artful psychic maneuvering, of
negotiating the self and the other. This is visible, too, in dairy—mother’s milk stolen from
another. Many do not make the connection that milk they drink is available to them only because
the baby it was made for has been slaughtered and eaten for lunch. Most humans eat other
animals—no longer hidden from sight, these animals are literally placed in(side) consumers’
faces, three meals a day—but most people do not want to really think about the “meat” that they
eat as actual animals. Humans weave together core psychoanalytic concepts in their engagement
with animals-as-food. The self, the other, the body, the mother, the breast are all presented in the
act of eating a cheeseburger. Melancholic tensions of desire and aggression, lost objects, and
unfulfilled wishes play out in the consumption of other beings.
This melancholic reaction is also manifested in the understanding of earth as property.
Kovel argues “that a man’s self—the inner idea of his personage—is united with and enlarged by
part of the ‘thing’-world” through property.41 Property becomes a paradox: property
melancholically recreates the connection with the earth from which the same concept of property
is severed. With the breaking up of the earth into pieces of property, humans have lost concern
for the well-being of the earth as a whole. The earth is in trouble, and more and more of the
consequences of climate change will emerge in the next decades. Climate scientists are now
stating that “society is in such grave peril” that they must now step beyond the role of
researchers and become involved politically to issue clear warnings about this stark reality.42
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Climate change denial would not be quite so terrifyingly pervasive if the public weren’t already
so accustomed to denial as a social practice.
Good/Bad
If the construction of self is so precarious as it is in a melancholic state, one also cannot
adequately negotiate the balance between good and bad. This split is particularly clear in Israel,
where the state has very clearly negotiated a split between itself as good and the Palestinians as
bad. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) provide to vegan soldiers berets made without wool and
boots made without animal leather. Vegan meal options are provided for all soldiers who want
them. Israel has been called the “most vegan country in the world.” The country itself is home to
many vegans, has many vegan establishments, and is promoted by many leading animal rights
organizations such as PETA, which has recommended to other armies to be more like the IDF.
Vegan Israeli soldiers explain that the IDF supports their compassionate lifestyle choices—one
particular soldier noted that if the army had not been able to “provide conditions that had harmed
no living creatures” she would not have enlisted in a combat unit.43 This phenomenon parallels
that of pinkwashing, in which Israel is internationally lauded for being particularly gay
friendly.44 How can the countless killings of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers be reconciled with
the same combat unit soldiers’ understandings of themselves as not harming any living beings?
Ahmad Safi, the director of the Palestinian Animal League, argues the only interpretation
is that Palestinians are not considered to be living creatures. Between January 2000 and January
2016, Israeli forces killed 1,977 Palestinian children.45 In contrast, from September 2000 to July
2014, the number of Israeli children killed at the hands of Palestinian militants was 131.46
Numbers like these are not accidents. How is it that Israel can come to completely disavow the
humanity of the people they have expelled from the land? Kovel argues that Israel, as a settler-
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colonial state, has produced a racism to “denigrate the culture of the lesser people as to call them
animals, or even vermin or bacteria, or to regard them as incapable of civilization, or,
particularly apt these days, to consider them as congenital terrorists, in contrast to [its] own
terrorists who act in a higher, that is, more human cause.”47 This denigration, apparent in the
above example of the vegan soldier, manifests as a denial. The splitting of the social psyche
allows for kindness to some (farm animals) while letting aggression out on the Palestinian
people.
This split also plays out in the United States, which reproduces itself as a “good” state by
punishing the “bad.” Solitary confinement is torture but is widely practiced in US prisons. What
allows for a society to hold itself above others for not using torture, while simultaneously
committing widespread acts of torture? The answer is not so simple as to be denial alone but
must be a sort of denial that accounts for aggression. Albert Woodfox was recently released from
prison, albeit not soon enough, unfortunately, to avoid having earned the title of America’s
longest-standing solitary confinement prisoner.48 Woodfox, one of the Angola Three, along with
Herman Wallace and Robert King, was falsely accused of murder because of his activism against
racism. All three suffered decades of solitary confinement in 6-by-9-foot cells; Woodfox spent a
total of forty-three years and ten months in almost continuous solitary confinement. He describes
his experience as “an evil,” explaining that “solitary confinement is the most torturous
experience a human being can be put through in prison. It’s punishment without ending.”
Finding an accurate number of people in solitary confinement is a difficult task, but an estimated
eighty thousand people are in restricted housing, another name for solitary confinement.49
Woodfox describes the process of trying to keep his sanity: “The panic attacks started
with sweating. You sweat and you can’t stop. You become soaking wet—you are asleep in your
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bunk and everything is soaking wet. Then when the claustrophobia starts it feels like the
atmosphere is pressing down on you. That was hard. I used to talk to myself to convince myself I
was strong enough to survive, just to hold on to my sanity until the feeling went away.” But he
explains that because many people in solitary confinement are unable to read and write, they
have less intellectual strength to help them survive the torture. He says, “Some of the guys found
the pressure so great that they just laid down in a foetal position and stopped communicating
with anybody. I’ve seen other guys who just want to talk and make noise, guys who want to
scream. Breaking up manifests itself in any number of ways in individuals.”50
What kind of society does this to people? People deemed criminals are taken and
tortured. President Andrew Jackson and others accused Native Americans of crimes such as
killing white babies and then killed native babies. Michael Rogin explains this behavior:
“Punishing the criminal permitted them to participate in the forbidden criminal activity.”51 The
prison system isn’t about confining societal dangers; it masquerades as a way to keep the “good”
safe but is actually a way to channel societal aggressivity toward an acceptable target, those
deemed “bad” in the good/bad split—the “Criminal.” By materially isolating people in solitary,
members of the society at large unconsciously isolate and protect their fragile conceptions of
self.
Michelle Alexander points out it is no longer socially acceptable to hate black people, but
one can hate the criminal.52 This was the rhetoric used around “superpredators” during the
Clinton administration and the rhetoric that continues today. In 2015, New York City Police
Commissioner Bill Bratton said,
There are people in our society, I’m sorry, they’re criminals. They’re bad people. You
don’t want to put them in diversion programs; you don’t want to keep them out of jail.
We need to work very hard to put them in jail and keep them there for a long time,
because they’re a danger to the rest of us, and that’s the reality. . . . We can’t lose sight of
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the fact that we have a hardcore criminal population in this city of several thousand
people who have no values, who have no respect for human life.53
Bratton’s attitude exemplifies Rogin’s point—people accused of having no respect for human
life are then treated with no respect for their lives as humans.
This is why Durkheim said, “In a sense—although certainly the expression is egregiously
inaccurate—one can say that up to a certain point the criminal is no longer a human being, that
we are justified in no longer viewing him as man.”54 I interpret Durkheim to mean that people
justify their view of criminals through their racialized projection of aggressivity and
dehumanization. Fanon knew this when he said that “projecting his desires onto the black man,
the white man behaves as if the black man actually had [these qualities].”55 Fanon sees this
paradox clearly because he bore the consequences of a racist society. “However, the scapegoat
for white society, which is based on the myths of progress, civilization, liberalism, education,
enlightenment, and refinement, will be precisely the force that opposes the expansion and
triumph of these myths. This oppositional brute force is provided by the black man.”56 And the
black man is forced, along with black women and children, to contain the state’s aggression in
his very body, in very small cells.
Disavowal
Of course, a society, or more particularly, a state, cannot explain that it is has constructed
itself in this fashion and thus must produce conditions of disavowal. In fact, this rewriting of the
construction of statehood is a key point that Audra Simpson makes when she says, “How to stop
a story that is always being told? Or, how to change a story that is always being told? The story
that settler-colonial nation-states tend to tell about themselves is that they are new; they are
beneficent; they have successfully ‘settled’ all issues prior to their beginning.”57 Dunbar-Ortiz
points out that there are currently “more than five hundred federally recognized Indigenous
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communities and nations, comprising nearly three million people in the United States. These are
the descendants of the fifteen million original inhabitants of the land, the majority of whom were
farmers who lived in towns.”58 Dunbar-Ortiz contends that
US history, as well as inherited Indigenous trauma, cannot be understood without dealing
with the genocide that the United States committed against Indigenous peoples. From the
colonial period through the founding of the United States and continuing in the twentyfirst century, this has entailed torture, terror, sexual abuse, massacres, systematic military
occupations, removals of Indigenous peoples from their ancestral territories, and
removals of Indigenous children to military-like boarding schools. The absence of even
the slightest note of regret or tragedy in the annual celebration of the US independence
betrays a deep disconnect in the consciousness of US Americans.59
This denial runs deep, as it is built into the entire societal structure. When Obama spoke about
brokering a deal between Israel and Palestine he affirmed the ability for complete denial with
this statement: “We sometimes make mistakes. We have not been perfect. But if you look at the
track record, as you say, America was not born as a colonial power.”60 The denial of the violence
of early white settlers has been passed down through culture for generations. And this is not just
because present-day Americans cannot bear to look back on the country’s violent history but
because this social aggression is still present, as seen in the violent dispossession of native lands
before the halting of the Dakota Access Pipeline.
Slavoj Žižek defines his concept of fetishistic disavowal as “I know it, but I don’t want to
know that I know, so I don’t know.”61 Using slaughterhouses as an example, Žižek draws
attention to what people try not to pay attention to, what people would need to forget “in an act
which suspended symbolic efficiency” to go on functioning in society; “what [we] know . . . but
. . . refuse to fully assume the consequences of this knowledge, so that [we] can continue acting
as if [we] don't know it.”62 I am less concerned here with the ethics of eating meat than its use as
an example par excellence of denial in its literal manifestation of the melancholic relation. This
can be illustrated through a mundane example: lunch. Though much sociomental and
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sociospatial work has been done to turn a pig into a ham sandwich, someone who orders it for
lunch nonetheless knows it is an animal. To reiterate, denial is not ignorance; it can only happen
when the denier knows the truth. By the time customers get to the lunch counter, despite their
spatial and cognitive labor, they still know they are about to eat an animal. So how does denial
play out here? The psychosocial perspective makes clear that aggression is not aberrant; it is
present all the time and is apparent when one eats the flesh of another being. It is an incredibly
aggressive act to devour another being, much as the melancholic devouring desire is aggressive.
Returning to Mel Chen’s point that the animal stands for what has been lost in humanity’s
domination over the earth, a human who eats the animal is melancholically relating to his or her
loss from humanity’s broken bonds to nature.
Moving from nonhuman animals to the earth and nature itself, a continued pattern of
aggression is particularly evident as a manifestation through capitalism. Some of the same
tensions of aggression and identity that are present in meat eating are present in the destruction
of the planet. There is a foreclosure in US society of humans’ primary bond with earth, as Kovel
explains: “Industrialization is not an independent force . . . but the hammer with which nature is
smashed for the sake of capital.”63 Capitalism is an exploitative and destructive system that
alienates people from their species being as a form of denial. Kovel makes a similar argument
when he says, “Separation/alienation/splitting is the fundamental gesture of capital. It applies to
the expropriation of peasants, but also forcefully to the industrial system, where technological
prowess in the service of value-expansion puts the finishing touches to the domination of
nature.”64 In trying to dominate earth, humans manifest their split from nature.
Of course, when the effects of environmental destruction are not distributed evenly it can
be easier for the more privileged to stay in denial; this is why, Smith points out, marginalized
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communities suffer its primary effects.65 Native reservations are called reservations because the
United States owns the land and reserves it for native people. Ownership, however, means the
United States can still do what it pleases with the land, such that military and nuclear testing is
almost exclusively done on reservations.66 Yet, Smith points out, Malthusian logic is used to
blame the global south for climate destruction through overpopulation, which, when it exists,
results directly from specific colonial practices.67 By shifting blame and, at least for now, the
consequences on to the oppressed, the privileged can remain in denial.
CONCLUSION
Jefferson points out that the move away from psychoanalysis in both psychology and
sociology has prevented an adequate understanding of hatred, particularly racial hatred, because
it curtails an understanding of its unconscious dynamics.68 One major contribution of this chapter
is to highlight unconscious desire for the things I discussed. Other discussions of denial69 contain
less analysis of the desire for atrocities. But people want others in prison. People want to eat
animals that were brutally slaughtered. What is denied is the desire for this and the deniers’
aggressivity. Members of a society have culturally shared desires and aggressions. It’s not
enough to ask why members of a population don’t act; the question needs to be why they set up a
culture where they don’t have to. Built environments and cultures are constructed around their
communities’ largely unconscious aggressivity without their acknowledgment that this is the
case.
The assumption in other theories is that individuals are all neutral to bad things, that no
one wants them, and that they deny them because they are too bad, too traumatic to handle. In
this chapter I have shown the situation is more complicated than this. Denial is not about
avoiding displeasure but about expressing aggression. There is a scene in The Walking Dead
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where the peaceful town of Woodbury, supposedly protected from the zombie apocalypse (a
metaphor for the aggressivity of the outside world?), has a monthly arena fight between humans
and zombies. The “governor” of the town says it helps the residents “blow off steam,” but it is
not meant to be understood that way by the audience, who is horrified by the “truth.”70 Evident
here is the murderous rage of normality, a trope common in stories such as “The Lottery” by
Shirley Jackson71 and the 2013 film The Purge.72 In both the story and the film, once a year
violence is encouraged. In “The Lottery,” once a year the town stones to death a member of a
family selected by a lottery. In The Purge, for 12 hours a year, all crime, including murder, is
legal. These stories highlight the problem taken up in this chapter: humans have violent drives
and impulses. Society cannot be properly accounted for without understanding the aggressivity
in each member and in the overall culture. These examples need not be taken literally, however;
if crime were legal for 12 hours a year, I suspect people would not actually all go massacre each
other. But I do think that what these stories do is represent the denied aggressivity that Western
culture sublimates into meat eating and prison, for example. Only a psychosocial scale of
analysis can adequately account for this dimension of society.
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Chapter Six
Denial and Social Movements
Social movement organizations seek to confront contested social problems—these
organizations make impacts with their work, but do they challenge the structural denial that
perpetuates the problems they struggle against? In this chapter I use the theory developed in the
previous three chapters to analyze the platforms and campaigns of five organizations. These
organizations correspond to the contested social problems I explored in past chapters: the Vera
Institute for Justice (mass incarceration), Greenpeace (environmental destruction), the United
States Campaign for Palestinian Rights, Standing Rock (settler colonialism), and People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA; industrialized animal slaughter). I chose the organizations
to analyze based on three criteria: they are national or international organizations, they are well
known, and they are predominantly single-issue organizations. Although there is some overlap
between Greenpeace and Standing Rock in that both are concerned with the Dakota Access
Pipeline, the organizations are still primarily focused on one issue each—Greenpeace is
primarily concerned with the environment and Standing Rock primarily with indigenous rights.
In the previous chapters, I identified how denial manifests on three levels of the social
and how within each level there are three specific manifestations. I therefore explore how the
organizations’ approaches to social change address denial as it manifests spatially in
containment, exclusion, and elimination. I look at how they address denial cognitively as it
manifests in ideas of dominion, identity construction through the other, and dehumanization.
And finally, I explore how they address denial psychosocially through unconscious aggression as
it manifests in constructions of the self, a split between good and bad, and disavowal. In my
analysis of these organizations, I use their websites as a text to see how they address these issues
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and, perhaps, denial. I also look to how a discussion of denial does or does not factor into their
work. In the conclusion, I discuss similarities among the organizations’ approaches and how they
address structural problems that may also address structural denial.
ORGANIZATIONS
In this section, I describe the five organizations: the Vera Institute for Justice, PETA,
Greenpeace, the United States Campaign for Palestinian Rights, and Stand with Standing Rock. I
discuss the founding and mission of each organization.
Vera Institute for Justice
The Vera Institute for Justice emerged from a project that began in 1961. Louis
Schweitzer and Herb Sturz created a social experiment they called the Manhattan Bond Project,
which led to national reform of the bail system in the United States. Vera, named for
Schweitzer’s mother, arose from this project’s success. Vera is currently undertaking over sixty
projects “that aim to unravel the impediments to human dignity and justice, while changing the
lives of individuals.”1 Its work is “characterized by a disciplined focus on specific problems,
partnering with public sector leaders willing to work with us to seek change, and a reliance on
rigorous research.”2 The Vera Institute’s mission is “to drive change. To urgently build and
improve justice systems that ensure fairness, promote safety, and strengthen communities.”3
The organization’s approach is to work with people who share its vision and what
organizers consider the most pressing issues of the day “from the causes and consequences of
mass incarceration, racial disparities, and the loss of public trust in law enforcement, to the
unmet needs of the vulnerable, the marginalized, and those harmed by crime and violence.”4
Within this vision there are three core priorities:
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•

“Closing mass incarceration’s front door”: “Our goal is substantially fewer people held in
jail”;

•

“Promoting safety, trust, and justice in a diverse America”: “Our goal is a justice system
fully prepared to deliver access, safety, and fairness to the diverse communities that make
up America”;

•

“Significantly improving the conditions of confinement”: “Our goal is envisioning and
enacting a system that prioritizes rehabilitation and socialization over retribution.”5

Within these three priorities Vera has three commitments or focuses: securing equal justice,
ending mass incarceration, and strengthening families and communities. Each focus has action
areas. Those covered under securing equal justice include “building bridges between police and
communities, supporting immigrants, reaching all victims, ensuring access for people with
disabilities and deaf people, [and] promoting racial equity in prosecution.” The action areas for
ending mass incarceration are “reducing the use of jails, bringing dignity to life behind bars,
providing second chances, [and] scoping the problem.” Action areas for strengthening families
and communities include “supporting kids and young adults, restoring community and family
bonds, [and] expanding access to health care.”6 There are more targeted focus issues within all
the action areas. The institute’s work is very organized and specific—each aspect of its work is
targeted toward Vera’s specific goals.
Vera’s work is aimed at influencing government officials, pushing for change from
within the system. The institute relies on research and evidence to produce documents to inform
policy. Like the Manhattan Bond Project, the organization continues to pilot solutions that are
then expanded upon success. For example, Vera produced a report on the negative impact of
pretrial detention, examining how jail contributes to the larger problem of mass incarceration.
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Through this report, it is pursuing changes to address the findings. Vera is committed to
shrinking jailed populations through reducing money as a determinant for release, reducing
overreliance on arrest, and diversion from jails for substance use and mental health services. The
organization is also doing work in over a dozen states and large cities to provide an extensive
analysis of their current practices of solitary confinement. It is, additionally, working to use
experimental federal funding of college in prison to generate sustained investment.7
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
In 1981, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) was formed as the
organizers fought their first case against animal exploitation. The Silver Springs Monkey Case,
as it is now called, resulted in the criminal conviction of an animal experimenter who was
charged with animal cruelty. PETA, as the largest animal rights organization in the world, has as
its mission to focus primarily on animal suffering in four main areas: the food industry, the
clothing trade, laboratories, and the entertainment industry.8 There are over five million PETA
members and supporters worldwide. The organization primarily works through “public
education, cruelty investigations, research, animal rescue, legislation, special events, celebrity
involvement, and protest campaigns.”9 Its slogan is “animals are not ours to eat, wear,
experiment on, use for entertainment or abuse in any other way.”10 PETA’s current campaigns
include military trauma training, US and French dog laboratories, SeaWorld (both in general and
Corky the orca in particular), veganism in diet and clothing, fashion brand Canada Goose’s use
of fur and down, cruel animal acts at UniverSoul Circus, adoptable animals, cruelty-free
cosmetics, the NIH and its primate laboratories, the abuse of Australian and US wool sheep, the
slaughter of seals for their skin (“Canada’s shame”), and America’s loneliest elephants.11 Though
none of its current campaigns explicitly target companies or individuals who use animals for
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food, PETA promotes ongoing advocacy in this area (exemplified in the “How to Go Vegan in 3
Simple Steps” campaign); this is what I will focus on.
PETA focuses on cows, turkeys, pigs, ducks, geese, chickens, and fish and other sea
animals in its discussion of factoring farming, looking not only at the suffering of animals but
also on the environment and human health. Additionally, the organization focuses on how “freerange” and “organic” labels deceive customers. Though its work is directed at multiple
audiences, a large majority of it seems to be targeted toward the general public.
The abuse that animals suffer at human hands is heartbreaking, sickening, and infuriating.
It’s even more so when we realize that the everyday choices we make—such as what we
eat for lunch and the kind of shampoo we buy—may be directly supporting some of this
abuse. But as hard as it is to think about, we can’t stop animals’ suffering if we simply
look the other way and pretend it isn’t happening. Animals are counting on
compassionate people like you to give them a voice and be their heroes by learning about
the issues they face and taking action. Each of us has the power to save animals from
nightmarish suffering—and best of all, it’s easier than you might think. If you’re ready to
join the millions of other compassionate people who are working to create a kinder, better
world for animals, please read on to learn how animals suffer in the food, animal
experimentation, entertainment, clothing and pet-trade industries. Together, we can make
a difference.12
PETA is known, in its own words, for “uncompromising, unwavering views on animal rights.
We aren’t afraid to make the difficult comparisons, say the unpopular thing, or point out the
uncomfortable truth, if it means that animals will benefit. . . . Our positions may be controversial,
but they are always true to our driving mission: to stop animal abuse worldwide.” Controversy
has been key to PETA’s strategy.13
Greenpeace
Greenpeace was founded in 1971 by a group of people who organized to protest US
nuclear testing off the coast of Alaska. In the organization’s own words, members “bear witness”
to environmental destruction by peaceful and nonviolent means. Its approach is to raise the level
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and quality of public debate. It has political and commercial independence because 250,000
members in the United States and 2.8 million worldwide members provide funding through
individual contributions. In the last 45 years Greenpeace has worked to “ban commercial
whaling, convince the world’s leaders to stop nuclear testing, [and] protect Antarctica,” to name
a few of its activities. Greenpeace is also committed to human social justice, which organizers
see as essential to challenging the systems of power and privilege that threaten the earth—
destruction of the earth will place disproportionate burdens on vulnerable communities.14 The
current campaigns that the organization is working on are “saving the Arctic,” “fighting global
warming,” living free of toxic chemicals, “defending democracy,” “protecting forests,”
“protecting [the] oceans,” and “promoting sustainable food.”15 In addition to creating awareness
among the general public, Greenpeace produces reports and conduct investigations.
United States Campaign for Palestinian Rights
Founded in 2001 and originally called the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation,
the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights (USCPR) is a national coalition of hundreds of groups
working to advocate for Palestinian rights and a shift in US policy. This coalition is united on
two sets of principles. These common principles include support for “a just and lasting peace for
Palestinians and Israelis based on human rights, international law, equality, and relevant UN
resolutions” and for “the Palestinian struggle to achieve freedom from Israeli military
occupation, justice for refugees through the implementation of their right of return, full equality
for Palestinian citizens of Israel, and the right to self-determination,” alongside opposition to
“U.S. military, diplomatic, financial, corporate, and all other forms of support for Israel’s
occupation and apartheid policies toward Palestinians” and to “Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, all
forms of racism, and any other expressions of bigotry directed at any person or group. We also
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reject the charge of anti-Semitism when it is used spuriously to silence legitimate criticism of
Israel’s policies and practices.”
The organization also has a set of antiracism principles, including opposition to “all
forms of racism and any other expressions of bigotry directed at any person or group” and to
“Zionism as a political system that privileges the rights of Jews over the rights of others. We also
reject the charge of anti-Semitism when it is used spuriously to silence legitimate criticism of
Israel’s policies and practices.” It is also within the scope of its antiracism activities that the
coalition “works to end actions and transform oppressive structures that sustain injustice in
Palestine/Israel”; the materials add, “We must also ensure that our actions and the actions of
those within our organization and coalition do not serve to support or perpetuate other racist or
bigoted behaviors, practices, and structures.” These principles guide USCPR’s work, which is
predominantly focused in two areas: government affairs and the boycott, divest, and sanction
(BDS) movement. The majority of its work is committed to mobilizing and organizing those
already involved in the Palestinian rights movements, though some is also to produce general
awareness of the oppression of Palestinian people.16
Stand with Standing Rock
Stand with Standing Rock is an official site of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, which has
been mobilizing against the Dakota Access Pipeline. The Oceti Sakowin camp is a gathering of
indigenous nations on the Standing Rock reservation. The tribe is currently located in both North
and South Dakota, and in the past its territory extended to parts of Montana, Wyoming,
Minnesota, Iowa, and Nebraska. On July 25, 2016, The US Army Corps of Engineers authorized
the construction of a 1,100-mile pipeline, known as the Dakota Access Pipeline, which would
transport crude oil through the Standing Rock land, specifically sacred lands. Since 2014, when
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the pipeline was still a proposal, Standing Rock has been organizing against its construction.
Though primarily organized by native people and organizations, Standing Rock has thousands of
supporters including “conservations groups [including Greenpeace], businesses, ministries and
congregations, celebrities, influential leaders, labor unions, student groups, and organizations
such as the United Nations Human Rights Council”; there are also about two dozen members of
Congress who oppose the Dakota Access Pipeline.17
Stand with Standing Rock primarily works to promote awareness for the Standing Rock
people and the fight against the pipeline. The organization does this in three ways, by creating a
“global call to action” with marches, such as the March 10, 2017, march in Washington, DC; by
serving as a platform for people to learn more about Standing Rock, the Oceti Sakowin camp,
and the fight against the pipeline and for clean water; and by soliciting donations to support the
struggle against the pipeline.18
ANALYSIS
One might at first assume that these organizations need to address denial by overtly
bringing it to the public’s attention and awareness, but given the analysis of denial in the
preceding chapters it is evident that awareness is not sufficient for social change. Each
organization is addressing a contested social problem, though they do not all do this in the same
way. Given this, the variety of interventions for social change in these organizations is important,
as denial manifests on multiple levels—many of the organizations seek to shift policy first,
which would then shift the social structure and result in a change of public opinion.
How Organizations Achieve Their Goals
The Vera Institute for Justice primarily works with those in government who can produce
policy, though some of its efforts do engage the general public—the director recently wrote a
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New York Times op-ed on the struggles of returning home after incarceration.19 PETA, on the
other hand, primarily targets the public, though some of its efforts focus on shaping policy.
Greenpeace, like PETA, also primarily targets the public through mass mobilizations,
campaigns, and petitions. USCPR works with the government to try to pursue resolutions and
legislation and mobilizes and organizes those already interested in supporting Palestinian rights.
Stand with Standing Rock’s goal is to gather resources for the people on the ground at Standing
Rock and cultivate awareness and support nationally through marches and statements of support
from public figures and lawmakers.
Each organization’s mission is to remedy the specific problem it focuses on, and they see
their problems ending in specific ways—each is looking for a specific kind of change. For
example, PETA would have all people “go vegan,” and Stand with Standing Rock wants to
preserve indigenous sovereignty over native lands and stop the Dakota Access Pipeline’s
construction. Given the different organizations’ intended audiences and goals, their strategies to
achieve social change vary. They are not all advocacy organizations that seek to generate support
for their issues, and they are not all trying to “unveil” the issues to the public. They also vary on
how much effort they invest in trying to convince people of an injustice—some try to promote
their cause among the general public, while others focus on organizing people who are likeminded, and still others focus on first creating the conditions that would lead to change. To
examine the way the organizations handle these options, I examine one way each has tried to
effect change.
The Vera Institute for Justice has many campaigns, but here I will focus on its efforts to
bring college education to prisons. Vera’s Expanding Access to Postsecondary Education Project
provides resources to state departments of corrections and encourages state and local policy
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makers to implement postsecondary education. Through technical assistance, training, and
information the project helps prisons develop policies and practices to increase access to
programs and serve as models for other states to follow. Vera took the opportunity presented to
them with the July 2015 announcement of the Second Chance Pell Pilot Program of the US
Department of Education. Vera produced a report that showed that “people who participate in
prison education programs are 43 percent less likely to recidivate.” They also found these
programs lower violence within the prison.20
PETA is known for its controversial and sensational ad campaigns, meant to generate
public discussion—in its own words, organizers use “gimmicks” like “wearing a funny costume,
engaging in a public stunt, or taking [their] clothes off” that are sometimes “silly” to “reach the
masses.” The organization says, “Experience has taught us that provocative and controversial
campaigns make the difference between allowing important yet depressing subjects to remain
invisible and exposing them to the public.” It focuses on “campaigns that draw international
media coverage to previously hidden issues.”21 For example, PETA does not shy away from
sharing brutality
Ramon Moreno, a longtime slaughterhouse worker, told The Washington Post that he
frequently has to cut the legs off completely conscious cows. “They blink. They make
noises,” he says. “The head moves, the eyes are wide and looking around. . . . They die
piece by piece.” Another worker, Martin Fuentes, told the Post that many animals are still
alive and conscious for as long as seven minutes after their throats have been cut. “The
line is never stopped simply because an animal is alive.” Because the industry makes
more money the more animals it kills, workers who stop to alert officials to abuses at
their slaughterhouse risk losing their jobs. The meat industry thrives on a workforce made
up largely of impoverished and exploited workers, many of them immigrants who can
never complain about poor working conditions or cruelty to animals for fear of being
deported.22
PETA targets its messages to individuals and encourages individual responses to the social
problems they identify. The concluding messages on its website pages are always some variation
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of “The best way to help put an end to this cruelty is to stop eating meat and other animal
products. Order PETA’s free vegetarian/vegan starter kit today for great tips and free recipes to
help you make the transition to an animal-friendly diet.”23 The organization very specifically
focuses on how “you,” the individual, can create social change through abstaining from
consumption of animal products.
Greenpeace targets its work toward organizing people who support their cause rather than
converting people to agree with them. For example, the organization does not try to convince
people that climate change is real. The section on “The Science” of climate change simply states,
“There’s no more debating if climate change is a reality. Scientists agree: the world is getting
warmer and human activity is largely responsible. Today, our planet is hotter than it has been in
2,000 years, and on track to grower hotter than it’s been in two million years.”24 The website
follows this with claims about how “citizens are demanding action” and calls to “join us.”
Greenpeace is recruiting to its “resistance”—in this way it looks for people who are already
concerned about its issues and looking to do more.
Donald Trump is packing his cabinet with climate change deniers and promises to pursue
more drilling, fracking, and mining of these dangerous fuels. We see a different future —
one built on clean, renewable energy. We believe that a 100 percent renewable energy
future is not only within reach, it’s our best chance . . . to preserve the planet. Trump may
do his best to delay the inevitable clean energy revolution, but he can’t stop it. If climate
denial is going to be the default position of the Trump White House, then relentless
resistance will be the default position of the American people.25
As this example suggests, in contrast to PETA, Greenpeace’s communications strategy is to
assume agreement on the issue and that the organization represents the “default position of the
American people.”
Like Greenpeace, USCPR also works to mobilize those who support its cause rather than
primarily convincing others of the merits of the cause. The organization’s work takes two
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approaches, government affairs and the boycott, divest, and sanction movement. Because the
United States supports Israel through military aid and diplomatic backing at the United Nations,
USCPR’s work is to intervene in US government support of Israel. It also works to challenge
federal and state legislation that seeks to prohibit or criminalize the boycott, divestment, and
sanctions movement and provides resources for students to develop BDS campaigns on their
campuses and to push their universities to divest from corporations that profit from occupied
Palestine.26
Stand with Standing Rock’s global call to action is meant to support those four thousand
people who participated in the camp. The Standing Rock tribe’s actions are all guided by its
principle of nonviolence, including the symbolic action it takes to bring awareness to the cause.
For example, one attempt to develop solidarity and public awareness was when “Standing Rock
youth and tribal members (ages 6–25) from the reservation ran 2,200 miles to Washington, D.C.
to deliver a petition with 160,000 signatures on Change.org opposing the pipeline to the
President of the United States. After running for 2,200 miles, they were only able to meet with
Army Corps officials, and held several rallies along the way.”27
Strategies and Denial
With these varied strategies for outreach and action, there are multiple ways each
organization addresses the problem of denial. In this section I explore overlaps between how the
organizations address denial and how I identified the problem in earlier chapters. In the previous
chapters I explored denial spatially through containment, exclusion, and elimination; cognitively
through dominion, identity construction through the other, and dehumanization; and
psychosocially through constructions of the self, a split between good and bad, and disavowal. I
suspected the psychosocial would be addressed the least, and for the majority of cases, I was
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correct—most attempts are targeted toward structural/spatial change and sociomental change. I
found that the Vera Institute had the overall most comprehensive approach to achieving social
change. Vera’s project, discussed above, falls under its action area “bringing dignity to life
behind bars.”28 This project, as I will explain below, targets spatial, cognitive, and psychosocial
aspects of denial. Ironically PETA, who tries to overtly call out denial more than any other
organization, is the least comprehensive, with the range of their strategies, to actually combating
denial. They focus most overtly on bringing cognitive awareness but do not address change
sociospatially or psychosocially. As I discussed in chapter two, if denial is understood as
structural then it cannot be successfully combated by targeting individuals alone—this is where
Stanley Cohen did not fully connect his theory to his policy recommendations.
I see the Vera Institute for Justice as having the most comprehensive approach to social
change, and it is therefore the most equipped to address denial, even though it spends the least
time of the five organizations trying to shape public opinion. Not that public opinion is irrelevant
to its work—its director does outreach such as New York Times op-eds—but that its primary
mission is to create the change the organization wants to see rather than convincing others of the
need for that change. They are then, in practice, no longer living and working in denial. Though
Vera does not try to tell the world about denial in the way, for example, PETA does, it moves
past denial in its work. The institute’s work to bring college education to prison does spatial,
cognitive, and unconscious work to disrupt denial of the problems of mass incarceration.
Education disrupts the carceral continuum identified by Wacquant (and discussed at length in
chapter three).29 Challenging the cycle of recidivism and social death from incarceration creates
opportunities for those formerly incarcerated and helps to challenge their invisibility and
disposability, as well as their sociospatial exclusion and containment from society. The
-119-

sociomental dimension of denial is addressed, too, by college education programs. Prison is
dehumanizing, and Vera’s program is meant to bring dignity (to the extent one could bring
dignity to a dehumanizing situation) to those incarcerated. Vera challenges this dehumanization
by supporting funding for college education programs, reminding those both inside and outside
the prison system that those who are incarcerated are still fully human. The psychosocial benefits
of college education programs in prison are more speculative, but the present analysis of
unconscious aggression suggests that the cumulative sociospatial and sociomental effects of
college education for those who were incarcerated may result in a structural change of status and
spatial and mental exclusion from society to the extent that the formerly incarcerated would no
longer be the hated “criminal other” onto which the culture at large projects its social aggression.
These cumulative effects are why I would suggest Vera’s program would be the most likely to
challenge structural denial.
As I mentioned, PETA has a very different approach from Vera’s. PETA shows the
public what is hidden behind the walls of a slaughterhouse. However, as I have argued, denial is
not ignorance, and people already know that animals are slaughtered in slaughterhouses—no one
is ever actually ignorant of the fact that meat is animals. In this way, PETA’s main approach to
showing the horrific realities of animal processing actually denies denial, paradoxically, in the
attempt to call out the denial. In other words, when PETA’s rhetoric forgets that denial is a
paradox of knowing and not knowing and treats the problem instead as ignorance, it feed into the
paradox. Animals used for meat are literally slaughtered and butchered, and people who eat them
literally eat body parts—bones and flesh; people eat the leg of (a) lamb, chicken breasts, pork
ribs. PETA overlooks denial in its campaign to show people what they already know. Showing
the reality to a public that already knows is not enough—PETA must confront that people can
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“not know” even as they take in all of this information. Of course, that said, PETA has five
million members and supporters worldwide, so it must be doing something effective. Its focus on
individual change is compelling. “You can help end suffering by going vegan” is an easy and
palatable approach to change. Though of course going vegan may sound extreme to some, it is
not actually a radical or structural change that disrupts society or social norms and systems of
oppression. In this way, though PETA presents itself as an “in your face” controversial figure in
the animal rights movement, it actually maintains the status quo in terms of the changes it
suggests. This maintenance of the status quo, in the end, does not challenge structural denial, or
even the systemic oppression of farm animals. PETA thus only works on the sociomental scale
and not sociospatially or psychosocially.
Greenpeace has an interesting approach that differs from the other organizations—the
way it organizes its literature sidesteps denial by writing as though everyone already supports
their cause. I do not think the organization is only appealing to those that agree with its goals
already, though it is doing that too; I think Greenpeace is presenting its side as if it is the only
reasonable one. Rather than acknowledge that many average people are in denial about climate
change, the organization frames it as if only a few powerful elites deny climate change—the
Koch brothers, for example. It positions itself as “your” voice—the voice of the people. This is
an interesting sociomental approach to change in that it starts with the world Greenpeace
wants—the world where everyone is against environmental destruction. The organization also
seeks to challenge those who have the power to shape the discourse on climate change; in this
way it may also effect sociomental change. Like PETA, Greenpeace seems to focus less on
producing sociospatial or psychosocial change and more on shaping the discourse around the
issue, which would then in turn produce changes on other levels.
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USCPR, as a coalition of those organizing for Palestinian rights, primarily works with
those who already support its goals—strengthening and expanding the BDS movement and
working to make sure that BDS stays legal in the face of growing legislation movements that
seek to criminalize BDS—and engages only minimally in outreach to the general public to make
them aware of Israeli apartheid. Boycotting, divesting, and sanctioning Israel provides a lot of
opportunities for change on different levels. Like Vera’s strategies for change, BDS’s can be
quite comprehensive. Sociospatially, BDS is ultimately meant to undo Palestinians’ geographic
oppression resulting from Israeli apartheid. By refusing to invest in anyone profiting from the
apartheid, BDS would make it no longer profitable, following a model of South African
resistance. Though BDS is also about material shifts, it requires a shift in consciousness and a
deliberate investment in no longer othering the Palestinians and making their cause one’s own.
There is also a psychosocial dimension to BDS—the potential for a deeper resistance to othering
that penetrates the unconscious: In truly caring for an(other) enough to take action on their
behalf, one may work to undo the unconscious split between good and bad and have a more
integrated understanding of the world.
Stand with Standing Rock is a complicated organization to analyze because of the
complexity and historical depth of settler colonialism. The Sioux tribe has survived five centuries
of oppression by European settlers, now Americans. Stand with Standing Rock addresses the
centuries of displacement and exploitation while also remaining focused on the specific iteration
of this oppression that is the Dakota Access Pipeline. Resisting the pipeline is resisting settler
colonialism. The camp at Standing Rock’s protection of the land, the marches, and the symbolic
act of hand-delivering petition signatures and solicitation of support from those around the
country are all efforts to resist settler colonialism but could not possibly undo the most insidious
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aspects of American colonialism—genocide has already been committed. This organization can
really only continue to resist, but ending the problem could not end without a full revolution of
the entire society. However, the actions of those committed to protecting the land and water, and
therefore the people of Standing Rock, have brought attention to settler colonialism in a way that
has not otherwise happened in recent times. Organizers’ resistance has generated a new discourse
around the issues of settler colonialism and, though it may not stop the pipeline and will not end
settler colonialism, these actions may have ignited a sociomental spark, bringing these issues into
consciousness.
CONCLUSION
There are a lot of ways to create social change and especially targeted, specific social
change. These organizations have used very different approaches with little overlap. The most
common level of social change to target is the sociomental. This is as I expected, as it is also the
level that academic work on the subject has focused. Overhauling a social structure is obviously
no easy task, and any organization that has it as a goal (as did some but not all of those
examined) will have an understandably difficult project. In many cases, the psychosocial scale is
too abstract to be the initial point of intervention, so the organizations that do address the
psychosocial do so by concretizing that project through geographic and structural interventions. I
found that no organizations seek to address the psychosocial dimensions of the problem on their
own, and if they do it is a result of addressing another level. Though I do think social change will
be best effected through interventions on the sociospatial, sociomental, and psychosocial levels,
these organizations do effect varying degrees of social change without always addressing all
three.
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The most significant finding of this study of organizations is that with the exception of
PETA, most organizations do not try to address denial directly. I do not necessarily think that
this is a problem, however, because I do not think that denial is best resolved overtly. This might
sound contradictory, but since denial is a paradox, it may have to be addressed through
interventions that seem paradoxical. In fact, what I think organizations could learn from my
study is that perhaps trying to address denial of the issue may not be the best approach to resolve
the issue. This is why I think the Vera Institute, though it does the least to shape public opinion
directly, actually takes the most comprehensive approach to ultimately combating social change.
To fight denial, as I have learned from these organizations, one might need, paradoxically, to
begin to act as if we are living in the world we want to live in and create the conditions for a
transformation to that world.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
Mark Rudd rose from his aisle seat and walked slowly, deliberately, to the front of St.
Paul’s Chapel. Several hundred members of the Columbia University community shifted
decorously in their seats as Vice President David B. Truman prepared to deliver a fiveminute eulogy to Martin Luther King, assassinated in Memphis five days before. Veering
to his right, Rudd stepped up into the choir, cut in front of the vice president and placed
himself in front of the microphone. Truman stopped; the microphone went dead. “Dr.
Truman and President Kirk are committing a moral outrage against the memory of Dr.
King,” Rudd said quietly, leaning over the lectern. How, he demanded, can the leaders of
the University eulogize a man who died while trying to unionize sanitation workers when
they have, for years, fought the unionization of the University’s own black and Puerto
Rican workers? How can these administrators praise a man who fought for human
dignity when they have stolen land from the people of Harlem? And how, Rudd asked,
can Columbia laud a man who preached non-violent dis-obedience when it is disciplining
its own students for peaceful protest? “Dr. Truman and President Kirk are committing a
moral outrage against the memory of Dr. King,” Rudd repeated. “We will therefore
protest this obscenity.” He stepped down from the stage and walked, shoulders hunched
slightly forward, down the center aisle and out the main chapel door into the April sun.
Forty others followed him. Truman continued on his way to the microphone and
delivered his eulogy as if nothing had happened.
—Jerry L. Avorn, Up against the Ivy Wall1
In this dissertation, I take an Althusserian perspective—just as no one individual can be
outside of ideology, no one can be outside of denial. That is not to say that awareness is not
possible but to emphasize that the argument I am making is structural: if denial is integral to
society, and one cannot be out of society, then one must participate in the systems of denial. Just
as no white person can ever be exempt from participation in a racist society yet may still be
vigorously antiracist, everyone exists in a society that produces denial. I am not making
arguments about individuals; my argument is that denial is macrosociological and structural.
Therefore, I am not interested in proposing that if one does not agree with ending something that
I articulate as an injustice, meat eating for example, that one is in denial; rather, I am saying that
society is structured by denial and is structured to produce denial. I do this with respect to the
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meat example by highlighting the social structures that cultivate denial, such as the industrialized
farm settings and the sociolinguistic maneuvers that turn a pig into pork. The dissertation is a
project about denial as a sociological problem and not the sociological impact of a psychological
problem. In this regard, then, asking “Who is in denial?” may be like asking who is in capitalism
or who is in sexism?
My argument is to consider denial on this level. Of course, denial is still a psychological
phenomenon, as well, and individuals are in denial about varied issues. I, however, wish to
emphasize the macroanalysis and thus do not engage in this current work on the situation of
individuals. This is comparable to a structural analysis of racism that makes a separate point,
distinct from talking about individual racists. In this work, I show the conditions through which
sociological denial becomes possible, regardless of individual intentions or awareness. Though I
do have opinions on the ethics of many of the issues I take up, as I suspect readers do, too, the
dissertation is not itself an ethical argument but a theoretical project that articulates structural
patterns of denial.
Sociological factors, such as gender, race, and class, play a crucial part in who it is that
can more easily be in denial. For example, residential segregation in the United States does not
prevent people in poverty from knowing about wealth but does allow the wealthy not to see the
conditions in which those without wealth live. Hegemonic masculinity, too, shapes how one may
or may not be able to engage with an issue. Men have been shown to express more “pro-meat”
opinions and emphasize their desire for red and rare meat.2 Cultural scripts about what it means
to be a man interfere with the ability to acknowledge the sentience of a farm animal, so that men
who find less-hegemonic ways of doing their masculinity are able to “do meat” differently.3 And,
similarly, it is easier for people of color to acknowledge racism in society, whereas white people
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still resist even saying that black lives matter. The existing literature on denial does not untangle
these complications sufficiently, focusing rather on a limited psychological “who” that is in
denial, namely the bystander.
No one is ever fully out of denial nor should necessarily be so. Denial on the individual
level is a protective mechanism that cannot be avoided. The aggregation of denial—when it
reaches a societal scale—is however a quite different issue. When denial is ingrained in social
institutions and these ideal types are cultural patterns, it has gone well beyond being a coping
mechanism. Structural denial limits individual agency to act in the social world. That most will
never bear direct witness to the industrialized slaughter of animals, those kept in solitary
confinement, the destruction and death in Gaza, the genocide the United States was founded on,
or the extinction of species due to climate change does not keep society or its members safe. It is
not coping. It is the result of a pathological social structure built on hiding problems that affect
everyone, albeit to differing degrees, depending on social position.
I am not proposing to eliminate denial, not that it would even be possible. Audre Lorde
said, “Revolution is not a one-time event, it is becoming always vigilant for the smallest
opportunity to make a genuine change in established, outgrown responses”4—this is how denial
must be confronted. Cohen compares denial to a physical defense, like an eyelid. It can be
helpful, but not if you keep your eyes shut forever.5 So given that social actors will always have
to be confronting denial, how can they enact social change? Denial is a process individuals
participate in, not a state. Individuals participate in it sociospatially, sociomentally, and
psychosocially, and it shifts and moves among these three scales. In this chapter, I take up how
progress is possible given this complex situation of denial.
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In this dissertation I have talked about five major examples: settler colonialism, mass
incarceration, Israeli apartheid, industrialized animal slaughter, and humans’ disconnection from
nature. But this dissertation is not about these cases; I have provided these as examples of the
social patterns of denial. In a conclusion it is typical to answer the question “So what?”; this is a
difficult question to address when speaking about denial—there are not clear policy implications
to follow from here. And I cannot propose ways to “solve” these five examples of social
problems, particularly when so many don’t even see these circumstances as problems—we must
lock up the bad people, we must eat animals to survive, and the earth and land are here for our
taking and we are entitled to use it as we please. Because my dissertation is not just about these
issues but about the social patterns of denial, even if these five issues were solved, social patterns
of denial would just play out in another area. There are countless possible examples to talk about,
both personal and political. This is not just about deciding to abolish prisons or recognize
Palestine as a state but about recognizing the societal patterns of denial that could reproduce this
in infinite other contexts.
As long as societies are structured around denial, there is not a clear solution to each
individual problem I have presented, as was evident in the myriad approaches to social change
presented in chapter six. Sometimes possible solutions emerge, but what I have sought to show
through analyzing three scales of society, and not just one, is that denial is modulated among the
three scales. Interventions may move something between scales, for example, from the
psychosocial to the sociomental or from sociomental to sociospatial. These interventions are not
unimportant but are insufficient. Racism, for example, may no longer be primarily constructed
sociomentally, as overt racism has been shifted to sociospatial structures and unconscious
processes. Progress becomes tricky, then. The Civil Rights progress of the sixties was not
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unimportant, but if the socially conscious are not vigilant, the problem will flow to other scales.
This vigilance needs to extend to the relations of how denial shifts among these three scales.
Otherwise, as happened in 2016, Donald Trump can emerge, rearticulating sociomental and overt
conceptions of racism that had been hiding in the structures and our unconsciouses. Without
confronting denial, these problems are simply moved in and out of sight and consciousness. This
is how fascism sneaks up on a society.
This iterative scale-shifting process needs to be constant. As I have shown in this
dissertation, in contrast to how it has been discussed in other literatures on the topic, denial is not
just about knowing, it is a sociological phenomenon that is structural, cognitive, and
unconscious. When denial is addressed just in terms of knowledge, it is not viewed as fully
sociological because the focus is solely on the sociomental. Fixing denial through
acknowledgment as Cohen and Zerubavel have suggested doesn’t address the physical structure
and material manifestations of denial or implicit and unconscious aspects. Any plausible solution
must vigilantly move up and down through all three scales. And those committed to
understanding and enacting social change must remember the significance of the unconscious.
Fighting denial in terms of acknowledgment risks individuating responsibility in a neoliberal
context that evades social responsibility. The structures of denial must be broken down on all
three scales to break down—this is a sociological problem that needs a sociological solution.
Another problem of acknowledgment, aside from not confronting all three scales, is that
it cannot be sufficient when people have the capacity to not-know, as well. This complicates all
levels of politics. We know to use safer sex supplies, but we don’t. We know to avoid refined
sugar, but we don’t. We know we should quit smoking, but we don’t. We know we should
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recycle and use less plastic, but we don’t. What a complicated situation for social change we
have uncovered.
Some discussions of denial position postmodern and deconstructionist ideas of “truth” as
part of the problem of denial. Derrida and Foucault are scapegoated and accused of facilitating
denial by questioning the nature of truth with “simply ludicrous” ideas.6 What these people miss,
however, is that it is not an objective truth that needs to be asserted to end denial. In fact, denial
can only really exist if one knows, on the one hand, a truth, whatever truth that is—and then
denies that truth. Denial only works when one has a sense of a truth to be denied. So the problem
isn’t that people don’t think there is an objective truth—as if all the facts aren’t in on climate
change, for example; that is only a post-facto, postdenial rationale. Knowledge that you deny is
not the same thing as denying truth or reality. It’s about the paradox more than if the knowledge
were true or not.
There are many ways in which people are pushing back by making some of this
conscious and challenging how categories are created, and there are even some examples of
moving from categorical to structural change. But it is too easy, if one is not careful, to end up
with strategies for social change that are too easily ignored and denied. When Mark Rudd
protested the whitewashing of Dr. King’s legacy, as shown in the opening quote, people acted as
if it had never happened. Much emotional and political energy went into such an action, and
though it may have helped to mobilize like-minded people, it did not effect the change or spark
the acknowledgment that I suspect Rudd may have hoped for.
Naming the elephants in the room, as Zerubavel has suggested, is an insufficient action
because the structural aspects of denial are put on like blinders on a horse. Individuals can only
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see so far. And certain changes paradoxically reproduce the system—or as Fanon has said,
“certain concessions are shackles”:
The people and every militant should be conscious of the historical law which stipulates
that certain concessions are in fact shackles. . . . The colonized must be made to see that
colonialism never gives away anything for nothing. . . . Whatever gains the colonized
make through armed or political struggle, they are not the result of the colonizer’s good
will or goodness of heart but to the fact that he can no longer postpone such concessions.
. . . The colonized, at the most, can accept a concession from the colonial authorities, but
never a compromise.7
These compromises are reforms that perpetuate the circumstances that produced the need for the
reform in the first place. Placing Harriet Tubman’s face on the twenty-dollar bill does nothing to
challenge the structural and unconscious denial of racism and slavery in the United States.
Moving Andrew Jackson to the back of the bill highlights the exact problem here—we have not
truly disrupted the status quo or acknowledged the problems—we have merely rearranged the
placement.
These reformist strategies that perpetuate the system are all too common in work around
prisons. Dean Spade does a very good job highlighting these problematic strategies, such as hate
crimes legislation that actually provides more money for law enforcement and their problematic
practices of policing.8 The same can be said for the development of prisons for trans people—if
prisons are built for trans people, trans people will just be found to fill the prison. This
reproduces the structure of mass incarceration and the denial that buttresses these acts, as though
people can be hidden away or the illusion that “correctional facilities” actually correct people.
The entire current discussion around reforms of drug laws play into this phenomenon as
well. Mass incarceration would still exist en masse if all drug offenders were released today.
Society does not want to confront that in order to adequately address this problem what needs to
be addressed is “violent crime.” The discussion of violence remains masked, and structural
-133-

change that would actually confront mass incarceration remains stalled as long as society refuses
to confront state violence and continues to criminalize certain kinds of violence over others while
at the same time doing nothing to confront the conditions that produce violence in all contexts.
Another reform is challenging private prisons. This is important as the for-profit model
creates incentives for prisons to be full, without regard to actual crime rates, but the majority of
prisons are not private. When reforms target only private prisons, the conditions that produced
the growth of the private prison industry—namely state and federal prison overpopulation—fall
from view. These reforms fail to get at the root of the problem and allow denial to continue to
flourish.
Not every political strategy, however, has to play into this problem—there are ways to do
work without an immediate revolution that don’t prevent its inevitability. For example, “Banning
the Box” is a movement to remove the box that asks if you have been convicted of a felony from
various application forms, such as for housing and employment. A relatively simple change,
banning the box would confront sociospatial, sociomental, and psychosocial aspects of denial
around criminality. Sociospatially, it would address housing and income disparites and has the
potential to confront the residential segregation that Wacquant has pointed out to be such a key
element in the reproduction of the carceral state. Sociomentally, it addresses society’s systems of
categories and places less emphasis on othering people who have been convicted of a felony.
Psychosocially, the unconscious aggression placed on criminals is diverted when a society can
no longer continue to punish them through poverty and stigma once their sentences are over.
Reenfranchising people who have been convicted of a felony also works to confront
multiple scales of denial around mass incarceration. Allowing people who have been so directly
affected by the law to participate in legislative processes may produce more democratic
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conditions where formerly incarcerated people have rights to representation with all the resultant
material benefits, as well as no longer being barred from civil society for life.
We can also begin to put fewer people in prison by practicing transformative justice.
When Mariame Kaba explains her view of transformative justice, it is clear she understands the
need to address problems on multiple scales. She states:
And when you talk about transformative justice, at least for myself, what I’m talking
about is that individual relationships occur within larger constructs, and there are larger
forces that impact our lives, which structure our relationships and our institutions. And
so, you have to also fight in a collective way against those forces of oppression. So while
you’re addressing interpersonal conflicts and while you’re trying to make sure that people
in communities know each other, have relationships with each other, have some tools to
be able to address the issues that come, the harm that people cause. While that’s
important, you also need to talk about making sure people have living wages so that they
have a way to live and aren’t having to rely on the illegal or underground economies that
are already criminalized to be able to make a living, but that they actually have the ability
to take care of their needs. And it’s not just a living wage— it might also be that we need
to be fighting for guaranteed jobs, or in some cases people like to talk about a basic
income.9
Without addressing denial on all three scales, people interested in social progress risk not
confronting it adequately and just waiting for it to resurface. But any alternative that must shift
power from the structure reproduces its own conditions. While it does give me hope that people
are talking about mass incarceration, the discourse must specifically engage with denial to effect
change. Talking about it alone will not be enough when it can just be put out of mind afterward.
Limited reformist strategies are not exclusive to discussion of mass incarceration. Wellfinanced social fantasies of “humane meat” derail any actual changes for animals who are being
slaughtered. And undercover investigations have shown no substantive difference in the
“humanely” raised “meat” and the inhumanely raised counterpart that serves as the absent
referent. Effecting change requires real structural change like a redistribution of subsidies for
farmers. The ecological impact of meat consumption, as well as the land that is appropriated
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from indigenous people and the natural resources that are exploited for meat production would
also have to be accounted for. Simultaneously, consumers would need to challenge their
conscious and unconscious relations to animals and examine the complexity of their desire to eat
them.
Confronting denial is no easy task, and there is no easy solution. Denial exists as a social
pattern that is deeply ingrained in society and flows through all scales of social arrangements. If
we are to confront denial, we must do so with that in mind—without being in denial about just
how much denial we are in.
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